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The impossibility of exactly describing existing states or future outcome is at the heart of many ﬁelds, such as economics,
ﬁnance, philosophy, and different problems in engineering and information sciences. The main goal of this paper is to pro-
pose a general framework for handling such situations, which is useful, in particular, for representing and reasoning with
incomplete and inconsistent information. The deﬁnition of our framework is based on the following two considerations:
1. Dealing with uncertainty by semantic methods. We ﬁrst show how logics for reasoning with uncertainty may be
deﬁned using the general notion of denotational semantics, and then concentrate on matrices, the most standard
semantic way of deﬁning a logic. In this respect, we note that one of the main principles of matrices is truth-function-
ality, according to which the truth-value assigned to a complex formula is uniquely determined by the truth-values of
its subformulas. This principle, however, is in an obvious conﬂict with non-deterministic phenomena and other unpre-
dictable situations that are common in everyday life. In [11], Avron and Lev introduced non-deterministic matrices
(Nmatrices), a generalization of ordinary matrices, where the value assigned by a valuation to a complex formula
can be chosen non-deterministically out of a certain non-empty set of options. This idea turns out to be very useful
for providing semantics to logics that handle uncertainty (see [8,9]), and in the sequel we consider several generaliza-
tions of these structures.
2. The main shortcoming of the logics induced by the semantic structures mentioned previously for the purpose of rea-
soning under uncertainty, is their intolerance of inconsistency: whenever a theory has no models in a structure, every-
thing follows from it, and so it becomes useless. In general, there are two ways of reasoning with inconsistent theories.
According to the coherent approach, consistency of inconsistent theories is restored (that is, the set of premises is. All rights reserved.
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Fig. 1. The circuit of Example 1.
O. Arieli, A. Zamansky / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 184–211 185‘repaired’; see, e.g., [4,16,33,54]), and ‘standard forms’ of reasoning (usually classical logic) are then applied for making
inferences. The other approach is based on paraconsistent logics, in which reasoning in the presence of inconsistency is
allowed, so that contradictory information may be introduced without trivialization (see, e.g., [12,17,48]).1 In both of
these two approaches, the ‘raw data’ is sometimes augmented with quantitative information, intuitively representing
degrees of belief, reliability or uncertainty (see, e.g., [2,15,18,23,45,54]). Our approach in this paper is paraconsistent in
the most general sense: we do not use a particular logic, but show how any logic induced by the semantic structures men-
tioned previously can be revised to an inconsistency-tolerant logic. This is done by relaxing the requirements from the set
of valuations under which inferences are made; Instead of considering only the models of the premises (i.e., those that
satisfy all the assumptions), it is possible to consider those valuations that are ‘most relevant’, in some sense, to the pre-
mises. This is the basic idea behind Shoham’s notion of preferential semantics [53]. In this paper we incorporate distance-
based considerations as the primary criterion for making preferences among valuations. Distance semantics is a common
technique for reﬂecting the principle of minimal change in different scenarios where information is dynamically evolving,
such as belief revision (see, e.g., [14,26,29,42]), data-source mediators [4,37,43,54], knowledge discovery from knowledge-
bases [49], pattern recognition [21], machine learning [50], and decision making in the context of social choice theory
[39,40,46]. According to distance semantics, a distance function (a metric) is deﬁned on the space of valuations, and is
extended to a distance d between valuations and sets of assertions. Now, unlike ‘standard’ semantics, in which conclusions
are drawn according to the models of the premises, distance reasoning with a given set of premises C is based on those
valuations that are ‘d-closest’ to C (called the most plausible valuations of C). The advantage of this approach is that the set
of the most plausible valuations of C, unlike its set of models, is never empty. This implies that, in distance semantics,
reasoning with inconsistent set of premises is not trivialized.
Our framework consists, therefore, of two main ingredients: semantic structures for describing incompleteness and pref-
erential (speciﬁcally, distance-based) considerations for handling inconsistency. The following example illustrates how a
combination of these two principles provides a solid platform for managing situations involving incompleteness and
inconsistency:
Example 1. A reasoner wants to learn as much as possible about a circuit, the structure of which is presented in Fig. 1.– Suppose ﬁrst that it is unknownwhether the gate denoted by the question mark is an AND-gate or an OR-gate. Non-deter-
ministic semantics will allow us to introduce a connective that simultaneously represents both cases. As a consequence of
this, one will be able to make some plausible conclusions about the circuit, despite the partial knowledge about it. One
such conclusion would be, e.g., that the value of the output line out1 coincides with that of the input line in1 (Intuitively,
this is because out1 ¼ ðin1 ^ in2Þ _ in1, and the interpretation of this formula is not affected by the functionality of the
unknown gate).
– Things might get even more complicated if one receives contradictory evidence about the circuit. Suppose, for instance,
that there is an indication that when in2 and in3 are turned off, out2 is turned on. This is impossible under both of the
assumptions about the functionality of the unknown gate, so the set of premises becomes inconsistent in this case, even
according to the non-deterministic semantics. However, this should not imply that the set of assumptions is trivialized
and so anything may be deduced from it. Distance-based considerations allow for drawing rational conclusions and reject
other assertions despite the inconsistency. For instance, one may retain the conclusion of the previous item, that the value
of out1 coincides with that of in1, as this fact should not be affected by the contradictory evidence about the circuit. On the
other hand, the assertion that when all the input lines are turned off so are the output lines of the circuit, is most likely to
be withdrawn under the new information.
This paper is a revised and extended version of [6]. Its structure is as follows. In the next section we discuss general
semantic approaches for maintaining uncertainty based on denotational semantics and, more speciﬁcally, based on
deterministic and non-deterministic matrices. We identify four different types of matrix-based semantic structures and1 For some examples of paraconsistent logics tailored for speciﬁc purposes see, e.g., [20,27].
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augment those semantic structures with distance considerations, thus allowing a better way of handling inconsistency. In
Section 4 we consider somemethods for computing entailments in our framework, and in Section 5 we adjust the framework
to Kripke-style structures. In Section 6 we conclude and discuss some directions for future work.
2. Semantic approaches for dealing with uncertainty
2.1. Preliminaries
In the sequel, L denotes a propositional language with a setWL ¼ fw;/; . . .g of well-formed formulas. The set fp; q; r; . . .g
of the atomic formulas in WL is denoted by Atoms. A theory C is a ﬁnite set of formulas in WL. AtomsðCÞ and SFðCÞ denote,
respectively, the atomic formulas that appear in the formulas of C, and the subformulas of C.
Given a propositional language L, a propositional logic is a pair hL;‘i, where ‘ is a consequence relation for L, as deﬁned
below:
Deﬁnition 1 (Consequence relations). A (Tarskian) consequence relation for a language L is a binary relation ‘ between sets
of formulas in WL and formulas in WL, satisfying the following conditions2:
Reﬂexivity: if w 2 C then C ‘ w.
Monotonicity: if C ‘ w and C#C0, then C0 ‘ w.
Transitivity: if C ‘ w and C0;w ‘ u then C;C0 ‘ u:
There are severalways of deﬁningpropositional logics. The twomost commonones are theproof-theoretical and themodel-
theoretical approaches. In the former, the deﬁnition of a consequence relation is based on somenotion of a proof in some formal
calculus. In the latter approach, the deﬁnition is based on a notion of a semantic structure forL. The general notion of an abstract
semantic structure is rather opaque, and it is usually based on some satisﬁability relation, as deﬁned below:
Deﬁnition 2 (Denotational semantics).
– A (denotational) semantics for a language L is a pair S ¼ hS;Si, where S is a non-empty set, and S (the satisﬁability rela-
tion of S) is a binary relation on SWL.
– Let m be an element in S and w a formula (in WLÞ. If m S w then m is called an S-model of w (alternatively, we say that m
satisﬁes w).
Let S ¼ hS;Si be a denotational semantics for L. Given a theory C, an element m 2 S is an S-model of C if it is an S-model
of every w 2 C. Now, the relation ‘S that is associated with S is deﬁned as follows:2 AsC ‘S w if every S-model of C is also an S-model of w: ð1ÞProposition 1. Let S ¼ hS;Si be a denotational semantics for L. Then the relation on 2WL WL deﬁned in (1) is a Tarskian
consequence relation for L.Proof. Reﬂexivity andmonotonicity are obvious from Deﬁnition 2 and from (1). For transitivity, suppose that m is an S-model
of C [ C0. In particular, m is an S-model of C, and since C ‘S w; m is an S-model of w. Thus, m is an S-model of C0 [ fwg, and since
C0; w ‘S /, we conclude that m is an S-model of / as well. h
Denotational semantics can be applied in different ways. For instance, possible worlds semantics for modal logics is usu-
ally deﬁned by a denotational semantics in which S is taken to be a non-empty collection of triples hW;R;i, where W is a
non-empty set (of ‘‘worlds”), R (the ‘‘accessibility” relation) is a binary relation on W satisfying a certain set of conditions
(varying from one modal logic to another), and  is a relation from W to WL that satisﬁes the usual conditions on Kripke
frames for modal logics. The satisfaction relation S is deﬁned in this case by hW;R;i S w iff w  w for every w 2W (see
also Section 5).
In this paper, we mainly use the most standard denotational semantics, based on matrices. The corresponding semantic
structures are discussed and deﬁned in the next section, where we compare four speciﬁc types of matrices, and, respectively,
four different kinds of consequence relations of the form of (1), that can be used to deﬁne propositional logics for reasoning
with uncertainty. We begin with standard (many-valued) matrices. Then we turn to non-deterministic matrices, a generaliza-
tion of standard matrices, in which non-determinism is introduced into the truth-tables. This gives rise to two ways that
valuations can be deﬁned: static [10] and dynamic [11]. In (purely) non-deterministic structures this leads to two differentusual, we abbreviate the union by a comma, so for instance C;w ‘ / stands for C [ fwg ‘ /.
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which is the third type of semantic structures considered below. Finally, the fourth type of semantic structures we consider
here consists of families of Nmatrices.3
2.2. Matrices, Nmatrices and their families
We start with the simplest semantic structures used for deﬁning logics (see, for instance, [28,52,55]).
Deﬁnition 3 (Deterministic matrices). A (deterministic) matrix for L is a tripleM¼ hV;D;Oi, where V is a non-empty set of
truth values, D is a non-empty proper subset of V, consisting of the designated elements of V, and for every n-ary connective
} of L; O includes an n-ary function e}M : Vn ! V.
A matrixM¼ hV;D;Oi consists, then, of a set V of the truth-values, a subset D of the values representing ‘true assertions’,
and a set O with an interpretation (a ‘truth table’) for each connective in the language L. We say thatM is ﬁnite if so is V. In
case that V ¼ ft; fg and D ¼ ftg we say that the matrix is two-valued (or a 2matrix).
Deﬁnition 4 (Models and satisﬁability). Let M be a matrix for L.
– An M-valuation for L is a function m : WL ! V such that for every n-ary connective } of L and every
w1; . . . ;wn 2 WL; mð}ðw1; . . . ;wnÞÞ ¼ e}ðmðw1Þ; . . . ; mðwnÞÞ. We denote by KsM the set of all the M-valuations of L.4
– A valuation m 2 KsM M-satisﬁes a formula w (alternatively, m is an M-model of w), if mðwÞ 2 D. We denote this by mMw.
The set of the M-models of w is therefore modsMðwÞ ¼ fm 2 KsMjmðwÞ 2 Dg. Accordingly, the M-models of a theory C are
the elements of the set modsMðCÞ ¼
T
w2Cmod
s
MðwÞ.
– A theory C is M-satisﬁable if modsMðCÞ – ;; C is an M-tautology if modsMðCÞ ¼ KsM.Deﬁnition 5 (Logics induced by standard matrices). The relation ‘sM that is induced by a matrixM is deﬁned for every theory
C and formula w 2 WL by C ‘sM w if modsMðCÞ#modsMðwÞ.
Note that the pair hKsM;Mi is a denotational semantics in the sense of Deﬁnition 2, and so, by Proposition 1, ‘sM is a con-
sequence relation in the sense of Deﬁnition 1.
Example 2. The most common matrix-based logic is, of-course, classical logic, which is induced, e.g., by the two-valued
matrix Mcl ¼ hft; fg; ftg; f e_; e:gi, interpreting the conjunction _ and the negation : in the standard way.
Deterministic matrices do not always faithfully represent incompleteness, or situations in which the truth-value of a for-
mula cannot be strictly determined. This brings us to the second type of structures, deﬁned by non-deterministic matrices
(Nmatrices for short). These are a natural generalization of the standard many-valued matrices, in which the truth-value as-
signed to a complex formula is chosen non-deterministically out of a set of options. This idea allows to express uncertainty
by the semantic structures themselves (as opposed to some other multi-valued logics, such as annotated logic [33,34], where
uncertainty is reﬂected by the syntax of the underlying language).
Deﬁnition 6 (Non-deterministic matrices). [11] A non-deterministic matrix for L (henceforth, an Nmatrix) is a triple
N ¼ hV;D;Oi, where V is a non-empty set of truth-values, D is a non-empty proper subset of V, and for every n-ary
connective } of L;O includes an n-ary function e}N : Vn ! 2V n f;g.
Again, we say that an Nmatrix N is ﬁnite if so is V. When V ¼ ft; fg and D ¼ ftg, N is called two-valued Nmatrix (alter-
natively, 2Nmatrix).
Example 3. Consider an AND-gate that operates correctly when its input lines have the same value and is unpredictable
otherwise. The behaviour of such faulty gate may be described by the following non-deterministic truth-table:3 Clearly, there are other ways of introducing non-determinism into the semantics, such as probabilistic or stochastic logics, but these methods are outside
the scope of this paper.
4 The letter ‘s’ stands here for ‘static’ semantics. This notation will be useful in the context of non-deterministic matrices, to distinguish between static and
dynamic semantics. We use it already for deterministic matrices to keep the notations uniform.
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this is an OR-gate or a XOR-gate. This can be represented as follows:Non-determinism can be incorporated into the truth-tables of the logical connectives by either a dynamic [11] or a static
[10] approach, as deﬁned below.Deﬁnition 7 (Dynamic and static valuations). Let N be an Nmatrix for L.
– A dynamic N -valuation is a function m : WL ! V that satisﬁes the following condition for every n-ary connective } of L
and every w1; . . . ;wn 2 WL:
mð}ðw1; . . . ;wnÞÞ 2 e}N ðmðw1Þ; . . . ; mðwnÞÞ: ð2Þ– A static N -valuation is a function m : WL ! V that satisﬁes condition (2) and the following compositionality principle: for
every n-ary connective } of L and every w1; . . . ;wn; /1; . . . ;/n 2 WL,if mðwiÞ ¼ mð/iÞ for all 1 6 i 6 n; then mð}ðw1; . . . ;wnÞÞ ¼ mð}ð/1; . . . ;/nÞÞ: ð3ÞWe denote by KdN the space of the dynamic N -valuations and by KsN space of the static N -valuations. Clearly, KsN #KdN .
In both of the semantics considered here, the truth-value mð}ðw1; . . . ;wnÞÞ assigned to the formula }ðw1; . . . ;wnÞ is selected
non-deterministically from a set of possible truth-values e}ðmðw1Þ; . . . ; mðwnÞÞ. In the dynamic approach this selection is made
separately, independently for each tuple hw1; . . . ;wni, and mðw1Þ; . . . ; mðwnÞ do not uniquely determine mð}ðw1; . . . ;wnÞÞ. In con-
trast, in the static semantics this choice is made globally, and so the interpretation of } is a function. This function is a ‘de-
terminisation’ of the non-deterministic interpretation e}, to be applied in computing the value of any formula under the
given valuation. This limits non-determinism, but still leaves the freedom of choosing the above function among all those
functions that are compatible with the non-deterministic interpretation e} of }.
Note 1. Ordinary (deterministic) matrices correspond to the case where each e} is a function taking singleton values only
(thus it can be treated as a function e} : Vn ! V). In this case the sets of static and dynamic valuations coincide, as we have
full determinism.Example 5. Consider the circuit of Fig. 2. If both of the components that are marked by } implement the same Boolean func-
tion, which is unknown to the reasoner, the static approach would be more appropriate. In this case, for instance, whenever
the values of the input lines of these components are the same (i.e., in1 ¼ in3 and in2 ¼ in4), their output lines will have the
same value, and so the output line (out) of the circuit will be turned off.
If, in addition, each one of these components has its own unpredictable behaviour (e.g., due to external noises on chip or
internal defects), the dynamic semantics would be more appropriate. In this case, for instance, the value of the output lines of
the two }-components need not be the same for the same input values, and so the value of the XOR-gate cannot be predicted
either.Deﬁnition 8 (Logics induced by Nmatrices). Let N be an Nmatrix for L.
– The dynamic models of a formula w and a theory C are deﬁned, respectively, by: moddN ðwÞ ¼ fm 2 KdN jmðwÞ 2 Dg and
moddN ðCÞ ¼
T
w2Cmod
d
N ðwÞ.
– The static models of w and C are deﬁned, respectively, by: modsN ðwÞ ¼ fm 2 KsN jmðwÞ 2 Dg and modsN ðCÞ ¼
T
w2Cmod
s
N ðwÞ:Fig. 2. A circuit of Example 5.
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– The consequence relation ‘sN that is induced by the static semantics of N is deﬁned by: C ‘sN w if modsN ðCÞ#modsN ðwÞ.
Again, as ‘dN and ‘sN are in the form of (1), both of them are consequence relations for L.
Note 2. It is important to observe that by Note 1, if N is a deterministic Nmatrix and M is its corresponding (standard)
matrix, it holds that ‘dN ¼ ‘sN ¼ ‘sM.
Example 6. Consider again the circuit of Fig. 2. The following theory represents this circuit and the assumption that both of
the }-gates have the same input:5 In [
6 As dC ¼
out$ ðin1 } in2Þ  ðin3 } in4Þ;
in1 $ in3;
in2 $ in4
8><>:
9>=>;:Suppose now that N is a two-valued non-deterministic matrix in which $ and  have the standard interpretations of the
double-implication and the exclusive or (respectively), and where } has the truth-table of Example 4. Denote by t and f the
propositional constants that are always assigned the truth-values t and f, respectively. Then C ‘sN out$ f, while C0dN out$ f
(For a counter-model of C, consider a valuation m 2 KdN such that mðoutÞ ¼ mðiniÞ ¼ t for 1 6 i 6 4, and mðin1 } in2Þ ¼ t but
mðin3 } in4Þ ¼ f; see also Example 5).
A natural question to ask at this stage is whether logics induced by non-deterministic matrices are representable by (ﬁ-
nite) deterministic matrices. The answer is negative for dynamic semantics (see Proposition 2 below) and is positive for sta-
tic semantics (by Proposition 3). To show this, we use yet another type of semantic structures, which is a simpliﬁcation of the
notion of a family of matrices (see [55]).
Deﬁnition 9 (Family of matrices, F -valuations, and their logics).
– A family of matrices for L is a ﬁnite set of deterministic matrices F ¼ fM1; . . . ;Mkg, where for all 1 6 i 6 k,Mi ¼ hV;D;Oii
is a matrix for L.5
– Let F ¼ fM1; . . . ;Mkg be a family of matrices. An F -valuation is any Mi-valuation for i 2 f1; . . . ; kg. We denote
KsF ¼
S
16i6kK
s
Mi .
6
– We denote by C ‘sF w that C ‘sM w for every M2 F .Example 7. Let F be a family of matrices with the standard interpretations for ^; _, and$, and the following interpretation
for }:55], a family of matrices may not be ﬁni
eterministic valuations are static, i.e. satisSuppose that we want to use F for describing the circuit of Fig. 1. The relations between the input and the output lines of that
circuit may be represented by the following theory:C ¼ fout1 $ ðin1 ^ in2Þ _ in1; out2 $ ðin1 ^ in2Þ } in3g:
In this case we have, for instance, that C ‘sF out1 $ in1. This demonstrates the ﬁrst item discussed in Example 1. To see, e.g.,
that C 0sF out2 $ in2, consider any valuation that assigns f to in2, t to in3, t to out2, and interprets } according to ~}1. Such a
valuation is an F -model of C and falsiﬁes out2 $ in2.Lemma 1. Let F ¼ fM1; . . . ;Mkg be a family of matrices, w a formula, and C a theory. Denote: modsF ðwÞ ¼ fm 2 KsF jmðwÞ 2 Dg
and modsF ðCÞ ¼
T
w2Cmod
s
F ðwÞ. Then C ‘sF w iff modsF ðCÞ#modsF ðwÞ.Proof. Suppose that C ‘sF w and let m 2 modsF ðCÞ. In particular, there is someM0 2 F such that m 2 KsM0 . Now, as C ‘sF w we
have that C ‘sM0 w, which implies, by the deﬁnition of ‘sM0 , that m 2 mod
s
M0 ðwÞ, i.e., mðwÞ 2 D. Thus m 2 mod
s
F ðwÞ. For the con-
verse, suppose that modsF ðCÞ#modsF ðwÞ. If C0sFw, then C0sM0w for some M0 2 F , and so there is a m 2 K
s
M0 , such that
m 2 modsM0 ðCÞ but m R mod
s
M0 ðwÞ. This implies that mðcÞ 2 D for every c 2 C but mðwÞ R D. It follows that
m 2 modsF ðCÞ nmodsF ðwÞ, in a contradiction to the assumption that modsF ðCÞ#modsF ðwÞ. hte, and its matrices may not have the same sets of truth-values and designated truth-values.
fy Condition (3), the ‘s’ in this notation is compatiblewith the relatednotations for the other semantic structures.
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Corollary 1. For a family F of matrices, ‘sF is a consequence relation for L.
As the next proposition shows, in the dynamic case Nmatrices can be used for characterizing logics that cannot be char-
acterized by families of ordinary matrices.
Proposition 2. Let N be a two-valued Nmatrix with at least one proper non-deterministic operation.7 Then there is no family of
matrices F such that ‘dN ¼ ‘sF .Proof. The proof is a straightforward adaptation of that in [11, Theorem 3.4], where it is shown that for an Nmatrix N as in
the proposition there is no ﬁnite deterministic matrixM such that ‘dN ¼ ‘sM. For completeness, we include here the details
for the generalized case.
Let N be a two-valued proper Nmatrix for L. Then there is an n-ary connective } and some tuple hv1; . . . ;vni 2 ft; fg such
that ~}N ðv1; . . . ;vnÞ ¼ ft; fg.
– Suppose ﬁrst that there is such a tuplewith v i ¼ t for some 1 6 i 6 n.Wemay assumewithout a loss of generality that i ¼ n.
Deﬁne, for some p1; . . . ; pn 2 Atoms,w0 ¼ pn andwiþ1 ¼ }ðp1; . . . ; pn1;wiÞ for iP 0. Let nowF ¼ fMi ¼ hV;D;Oiiji ¼ 1; . . . kg
be a family of matrices for L in which jVj ¼ m. For every matrixMi 2 F and every mi 2 KMi there is some j < m such that
mðwmÞ ¼ mðwjÞ. (Indeed, if there are 0 6 j1 < j2 < m so that mðwj1 Þ ¼ mðwj2 Þ then asMi is a matrix, mðwmÞ ¼ mðwmj2þj1 Þ. Other-
wise, if m assigns different values to all them formulas w0; . . . ;wm1, then mðwmÞmust be one of these values, since there are
onlymvalues inV). It follows that for everymatrixMi 2 F it holds thatw0; . . . ;wm1 ‘sMi wm, and sow0; . . . ;wm1 ‘
s
F wm aswell.
On the other hand, w0; . . . ;wm10dNwm, since the valuation l, in which lðpiÞ ¼ v i for all 1 6 i 6 n, lðwiÞ ¼ t for all 0 6 i 6 m,
and lðwmÞ ¼ f, is an element in KN (because ~}N ðv1; . . . ;vnÞ ¼ ft; fg and vn ¼ t).
– Assume now that hf; . . . ; fi is the only tuple for which ~}N ðv1; . . . ; vnÞ ¼ ft; fg. Wemay assume that n ¼ 1 (otherwise, deﬁne
}0ðuÞ ¼ }ðu; . . . ;uÞ and use }0). So ~}N ðfÞ ¼ ft; fg and either ~}N ðtÞ ¼ ffg or ~}N ðtÞ ¼ ftg. Next, we consider these two pos-
sibilities. To shorten the proof, we assume that } is the only connective of L.
1. If ~}N ðtÞ ¼ ffg, then fp;}pg has no N -model, and so p;}p ‘dN q. Thus, if F ¼ fMi ¼ hV;D;Oiiji ¼ 1; . . . kg is a family of
matrices such that ‘dN #‘sF , then p;}p ‘sF q as well, i.e., p;}p ‘sMi q for everyMi 2 F , and so ~}Mi ðvÞ R D if v 2 D. Thus, if
~}jMi ðvÞ denotes j applications of ~}Mi ðvÞ, for every v 2 V it holds that ~}
j
Mi ðvÞ R D for an arbitrary large j. It follows that
for D ¼ V  D ¼ ff1; . . . ; flg there exist positive numbers n1; . . . ;nl such that ni  niþ1 P 2 and ~}njMi ðfiÞ R D for all 1 6 j 6 l
(where we let nlþ1 ¼ 0Þ. Hence, }n1 ðpÞ; . . . ;}nl ðpÞ ‘sMi p for everyMi 2 F , i.e., }
n1 ðpÞ; . . . ;}nl ðpÞ ‘sF p. On the other hand,
}n1 ðpÞ; . . . ;}nl ðpÞ0dNp, since a valuation l deﬁned by lðwÞ ¼ t iff w 2 f}n1 ðpÞ; . . . ;}nl ðpÞg is an N -model of
f}n1 ðpÞ; . . . ;}nl ðpÞg, which is not a model of p.
2. If ~}N ðtÞ ¼ ftg then p ‘dN }p. Thus, if F ¼ fMi ¼ hV;D;Oiiji ¼ 1; . . . kg is a family of matrices such that ‘dN #‘sF , then
p ‘sF }p, as well, i.e., p ‘sMi }p for every Mi 2 F , and so ~}Mi ðvÞ 2 D if v 2 D. It follows that for every v 2 D and
Mi 2 F , either ~}nMi ðvÞ R D for all nP 0 or there is nv P 1 so that ~}nMi ðvÞ 2 D for all nP nv . Let j be the maximum
of the nv ’s of the v’s of the second kind (and 0 is no such v exists). Then }jþ1ðpÞ ‘sMi }
jðpÞ for every Mi 2 F , i.e.,
}jþ1ðpÞ ‘sF }jðpÞ. On the other hand, }jþ1ðpÞ0dN}jðpÞ, since by deﬁning mðpÞ ¼ mð}ðpÞÞ ¼ . . . mð}jðpÞÞ ¼ f and
mð}jþ1ðpÞÞ ¼ t, we get an N -valuation that is a model of }jþ1ðpÞ but not of }jðpÞ. h
The situation is different for the static semantics. As we show below, reasoning with ‘sN can be simulated by a family of
ordinary matrices. For this, we need the next notions.
Deﬁnition 10 (Simple reﬁnements). [8] Let N 1 ¼ hV1;D1;O1i and N 2 ¼ hV2;D2;O2i be Nmatrices for L. N 1 is called a simple
reﬁnement of N 2 if V1 ¼ V2;D1 ¼ D2, and ~}N 1 ðxÞ# ~}N 2 ðxÞ for every n-ary connective } of L and every tuple x 2 Vn.
Intuitively, an Nmatrix reﬁnes another Nmatrix if the former is more restricted than the latter in the non-deterministic
choices of its operators.
Deﬁnition 11 (Cartesian family).
– Given an Nmatrix N , we denote by #N the family of deterministic matrices that are simple reﬁnements of N .
– A family of matrices F for L is called Cartesian, if there is some Nmatrix N for L, such that F ¼#N .Example 8. Consider again the Nmatrix N of Example 3. Then #N is the (Cartesian) family of matrices with the four
interpretations of }, given in Example 7.7 That is, there is an operation whose interpretation does not consist only of singletons. We call such an N proper Nmatrix.
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Proposition 3. For every Nmatrix N it holds that ‘sN ¼ ‘s#N .Proof. For the proof we need the following lemmas:
Lemma 2 [8]. If N 2 is a simple reﬁnement of N 1, then ‘dN 1 #‘dN 2 and ‘sN 1 #‘sN 2 .Lemma 3. Let N ¼ hV;D;Oi be an Nmatrix for L and let m 2 KsN . Then there is a deterministic matrixM for L, such thatM is a
simple reﬁnement of N and m 2 KsM.Proof. Let N ¼ hV;D;Oi be an Nmatrix and m 2 KsN . Consider a deterministic matrixMm ¼ hV;D;Omi, deﬁned as follows: for
every n-ary connective } of L let ~}M 2 Om be the n-ary function deﬁned as follows: for every tuple v ¼ hv1; . . . ;vni 2 Vn, if
there are formulas w1; . . . ;wn 2 WL such that mðwiÞ ¼ v i ði ¼ 1; . . . ;nÞ, let ~}MðvÞ ¼ mð}ðw1; . . . ;wnÞÞ. Otherwise, choose some
v 2 ~}N ðv1; . . . ;vnÞ and let ~}MðvÞ ¼ v . As ~}M# ~}N ;M is a simple reﬁnement of N . Moreover, the fact that m is a static N -
valuation means, by Condition (3) in Deﬁnition 7, that for every n-ary connective } of L and formulas
w1; . . . ;wn;u1; . . . ;un 2 WL such that mðwiÞ ¼ mðuiÞ for every 1 6 i 6 n, it holds that mð}ðw1; . . . ;wnÞÞ ¼ mð}ðu1; . . . ;unÞÞ. This
implies that m is also an M-valuation, i.e., m 2 KsM. h
Now we can show Proposition 3: Suppose that C ‘sN w and let M2 #N . By Lemma 2, as M is a simple reﬁnement of
N ;C ‘sM w. Thus, C ‘s#N w. For the converse, suppose for a contradiction that C ‘s#N w but C 0sN w. Then there is some
m 2 KsN that N -satisﬁes C but does not satisfy w in N . By Lemma 3, there is some M2#N such that m 2 KsM. Thus,
C 0sM w and so C 0
s
#N w, in contradiction to our assumption. h
As the following example shows, there are useful families of matrices that are not Cartesian.
Example 9. Suppose that we have a gate }, which is either an AND or an OR gate, but it is not known which one. Note that
this situation cannot be represented by the non-deterministic truth-table of Example 3, since in both static and dynamic
semantics considered in Deﬁnition 7 the two choices for ~}ðt; fÞ are completely independent of the choices for ~}ðf; tÞ. What
we need is a more precise representation that makes choices between two deterministic matrices, each one of which
represents a possible (deterministic) behaviour of the unknown gate. In other words, among the four matrices of Example 7,
only the ﬁrst two give a faithful representation of our gate:8 ToIt is easy to see (by, e.g., Lemma 5) that F is not Cartesian.
More on the relation between Nmatrices and families of matrices in the two-valued case is given in Section 2.3.
Finally, we combine the concepts of Nmatrices and of families, to introduce the notion of families of Nmatrices.8
Deﬁnition 12 (Family of Nmatrices, G-valuations, and their logics).
– A family of Nmatrices is any ﬁnite set of Nmatrices G ¼ fN 1; . . . ;N kg, where N i ¼ hV;D;Oii for all 1 6 i 6 k.
– Let G ¼ fN 1; . . . ;N kg be a family of Nmatrices. A G-valuation is any N i-valuation for i 2 f1; . . . ; kg. Accordingly, for
x 2 fd;sg, we denote KxG ¼
S
16i6nK
x
N i .
– We denote by C ‘xG w that C ‘xN w for every N 2 G.Example 10. Consider again the circuit from Fig. 1. Suppose that it is not known whether the gate ‘?’ is an AND-gate or an
OR-gate. Moreover, suppose that we know that this is a faulty gate whose output value is unpredictable when both of its
input lines are turned on. This situation may be represented by the following family of Nmatrices:the best of our knowledge, this kind of semantic structures has not been considered before in the literature.
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As in the deterministic case, we have the following lemma and corollary.
Lemma 4. Let G ¼ fN 1; . . . ;N kg be a family of Nmatrices, w a formula and C a theory. For x 2 fd;sg, denote
modxGðwÞ ¼ fm 2 KxGjmðwÞ 2 Dg and modxGðCÞ ¼
T
w2Cmod
x
GðwÞ. Then C ‘xG w iff modxGðCÞ#modxGðwÞ.Corollary 2. For a family G of Nmatrices, ‘dG and ‘sG are consequence relations for L.
Concerning the simulation of ‘xG by other consequence relations (i.e., the ability to construct a consequence relation that is
the same as ‘xG , using other kinds of matrices), we note the following:
– In the dynamic case, we have already seen that even logics induced by a single Nmatrix cannot be simulated by a family of
ordinary matrices.
– In the static case, logics induced by a family of Nmatrices can be simulated using a family of ordinary matrices:
Proposition 4. For every family of Nmatrices G there is a family of matrices F such that ‘sG ¼ ‘sF .
Proof. For G ¼ fN 1; . . . ;N kg let F ¼
S
16i6kF i, where F i ¼#N iði ¼ 1; . . . ; kÞ. By Proposition 3, for all 1 6 i 6 k it holds that
‘sN i ¼ ‘
s
#N i . Thus, C ‘
s
G w iff C ‘sN i w for all 1 6 i 6 k, iff C ‘
s
#N i w for all 1 6 i 6 k, iff C ‘
s
F iw for all 1 6 i 6 k, iff C ‘
s
F w. h
In the rest of the paper (except for the generalization to multi-valued possible worlds semantics, considered in Section 5),
we focus on the two-valued case. We shall use the meta-variableM to range over the two-valued semantic structures deﬁned
previously, and use themeta-variable x to range over the set fs;dg, denoting the restriction on valuations (i.e., ‘ d’ for dynamic
valuations and ‘ s’ for static ones). Accordingly, the set KxM will denote the relevant space of valuations and the set mod
x
MðwÞ
will denote the relevant set of models of w. The superscripts ‘ s’, ‘ d’ or ‘ x’ will sometimes be omittedwhen the context is clear.
Likewise, notions likeM-satisﬁability will be used whenever it is known whether dynamic or static valuations are involved.
2.3. Hierarchy of the two-valued semantic structures
There are different criteria according to which the semantic structures considered here may be divided, among which are
the following:
– Basic semantic structures or families of structures. The former (i.e., standard matrices and Nmatrices) are, of course, a par-
ticular case of the latter, where families are singletons.
– Deterministic or non-deterministic semantics. Here, the distinction is between an interpretation of a connective in (families
of) matrices that is a function returning a truth-value, in opposed to an interpretation of a connective in (families of)
Nmatrices, which is a function returning a non-empty set of truth-values.
– Dynamicor static valuations. Indeterministic semantic structures (standardmatrices and their families) anyvaluation satisﬁes
Condition (3) in Deﬁnition 7, and so there is no difference between these two types of valuations. In non-deterministic struc-
tures (Nmatrices and their families), however, the set of static valuations is a proper subset of the set of dynamic valuations.
In what follows, we compare the semantic structures with respect to their relative expressive power.
Deﬁnition 13. We use the following conventions to denote the classes of logics induced by the two-valued semantic
structures deﬁned previously.
– A logic that is induced by a (standard) 2matrix is an M-logic. The class of M-logics is denoted by M.
– A logic based on a static (respectively, dynamic) 2Nmatrix is called an SN-logic (respectively, a DN-logic). The class of SN-
logics (DN-logics) is denoted SN (DN).
– A logic that is induced by a family of 2matrices is an F-logic. We denote the class of F-logics by F.
– A logic based on a family of static (dynamic) 2Nmatrices is called an SG-logic (DG-logic). The class of SG-logics (DG-logics)
is denoted SG (DG).
Henceforth, we assume that the language L includes the propositional constants t and f (that are always assigned the
truth-values t and f, respectively, by every valuation in KxM).
The relations between the classes of logics in Deﬁnition 13 are given in Theorem 1 and Corollary 3 at the end of this sec-
tion (see also Fig. 3). First, we need the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Let F be a family of matrices for L with standard negation and conjunction. Then L ¼ hL;‘sF i is an SN-logic iff F is
Cartesian.
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Deﬁnition 14. LetM1 ¼ hV;D;O1i; M2 ¼ hV;D;O2i be two matrices for L. The NmatrixM1
UM2 ¼ hV;D;Oi is deﬁned, for
every n-ary connective } of L and every v1; . . . ;vn 2 V, by ~}Mðv1; . . . ;vnÞ ¼ ~}M1 ðv1; . . . ; vnÞ [ ~}M2 ðv1; . . . ;vnÞ.
It is easy to see that the operation
U
is symmetric and associative. Its relation to # is given by the following lemma:
Lemma 5. If a family F is Cartesian, then F ¼#ðUM2FMÞ.
Proof. Follows by the fact that if N is an Nmatrix such that F ¼#N , then it holds that N ¼ UM2FM. The latter is easily
veriﬁable. hLemma 6. For any family F of matrices and any Nmatrix N such that ‘sF ¼ ‘sN , it holds that N ¼
U
M2FM.Proof. Let N be an Nmatrix for L, such that ‘sF ¼ ‘sN . Denote Nþ ¼
U
M2FM. Suppose for contradiction that N – Nþ. Then
there is some n-ary connective } in L and v1; . . . ;vn 2 ft; fg, such that ~}N ðv1; . . . ; vnÞ– ~}Nþðv1; . . . ;vnÞ. Let cv i be the con-
stant corresponding to the truth-value v i. One of the following cases holds:
– ~}Nþðv1; . . . ;vnÞ ¼ ffg. Then ~}N ðv1; . . . ;vnÞ is either ftg or ft; fg. Also, by deﬁnition of Nþ, for every M2 F :
~}Mðv1; . . . ;vnÞ ¼ f. Hence, for every M2 F ;}ðcv1 ; . . . ;cvn Þ‘sMf, and so }ðcv1 ; . . . ;cvn Þ‘sFf. However, since there is some
m 2 KN , such that mð}ðcv1 ; . . . ;cvn ÞÞ ¼ t, obviously }ðcv1 ; . . . ;cvn Þ0sNf, in contradiction to the assumption that ‘sF ¼ ‘sN .
– ~}Nþðv1; . . . ;vnÞ ¼ ftg. Then ~}N ðv1; . . . ;vnÞ is either ffg or ft; fg. Also, by deﬁnition of Nþ, for every M2 F :
~}Mðv1; . . . ;vnÞ ¼ t. Hence for every M2 F ;‘sM}ðcv1 ; . . . ;cvn Þ, and so ‘sF}ðcv1 ; . . . ;cvn Þ. However, since there is some
m 2 KN , such that mð}ðcv1 ; . . . ;cvn ÞÞ ¼ f;0sN}ðcv1 ; . . . ;cvn Þ, in contradiction to our assumption.
– ~}Nþðv1; . . . ;vnÞ ¼ ft; fg. Then ~}N ðv1; . . . ;vnÞ is either ffg or ftg, and so either }ðcv1 ; . . . ;cvn Þ ‘sN f or ‘sN}ðcv1 ; . . . ;cvn Þ.
Also, by deﬁnition of Nþ, there are M1;M2 2 F , such that ~}M1 ðv1; . . . ;vnÞ ¼ t and ~}M2 ðv1; . . . ;vnÞ ¼ f. Hence,
}ðcv1 ; . . . ;cvn Þ0sF f and 0sF}ðcv1 ; . . . ;cvn Þ, in contradiction to our assumption. hLemma 7. Let F be a family of matrices for L and let N ¼ UM2FM. Then ‘sN #‘sF .
Proof. Every M 2 F is a simple reﬁnement of N . Thus, by Lemma 2, ‘sN #‘sM for every M 2 F , and so ‘sN #‘sF . hLemma 8. Let N 1 and N 2 be two-valued Nmatrices for L. Then ‘xN 1 ¼ ‘xN 2 iff N 1 ¼ N 2.Proof. We consider static semantics (i.e., where x ¼ s); the other case is similar.
One direction is trivial. For the other, let N 1 and N 2 be two different two-valued Nmatrices. Then there is some n-ary
connective } in L and v1; . . . ;vn 2 ft; fg, such that ~}N 1 ðv1; . . . ;vnÞ – ~}N 2 ðv1; . . . ;vnÞ. Now,
– If both of ~}N 1 ðv1; . . . ;vnÞ and ~}N 2 ðv1; . . . ;vnÞ are singletons, then without loss of generality, ~}N 1 ðv1; . . . ;vnÞ ¼ ftg and
~}N 2 ðv1; . . . ;vnÞ ¼ ffg. Hence, ‘sN 1}ðcv1 ; . . . ;cvn Þ and 0sN 2}ðcv1 ; . . . ;cvn Þ.
– Otherwise, one of the sets is equal to ft; fg. Suppose that ~}N 1 ðv1; . . . ;vnÞ ¼ ft; fg and ~}N 2 ðv1; . . . ;vnÞ ¼ ffg. Then
}ðcv1 ; . . . ;cvn Þ0sN 1f and }ðcv1 ; . . . ;cvn Þ‘
s
N 2f.
9 The other cases are similar.
In both cases we therefore have that ‘sN 1 – ‘sN 2 . hLemma 9. Let F 1 and F 2 be families of (two-valued) matrices with standard interpretations for negation and conjunction. Then
‘sF1 ¼ ‘sF2 iff F 1 ¼ F 2.Proof. Again, one direction is trivial. For the other, let F be a family of matrices. Using classical negation, conjunction and
disjunction (which is expressible by negation and conjunction), the truth-tables of each M2 F are encodable as follows:
Given a matrix M for L, let9 Not
standarWM ¼
^
}2L
^
v2ft;fgn
wM}ðvÞ
0@ 1A;
e that this proof does not assume anything about the other connectives in L. In particular, if L has a negation connective : and N 1;N 2 interpret it in the
d way, one may conclude here that 0sN 1:}ðcv1 ; . . . ;cvn Þ and ‘
s
N 2:}ðcv1 ; . . . ;cvn Þ.
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}ðcv1 ; . . . ;cvnÞ if ~}MðvÞ ¼ t;
:}ðcv1 ; . . . ;canÞ if ~}MðvÞ ¼ f:
(
Clearly, mðWMÞ ¼ t iff m 2 KsM. Now, for a family F of matrices, we letWF ¼
_
M2F
WM:It is easy to see that ‘sF0WF iff F0#F .
Suppose now that F 1 – F 2. Then there is some m 2 KsF2 n KsF1 , and so 0sF2WF1 while ‘sF1WF1 . Hence, ‘sF1 – ‘sF2 . h
Now we can show Proposition 5:
Proof (of Proposition 5). If F is Cartesian, then there is some Nmatrix N such that F ¼#N . By Proposition 3,
‘sF ¼ ‘s#N ¼ ‘sN , and so L is an SN-logic. For the converse, suppose that F is not Cartesian and assume for contradiction
that L is an SN-logic. Then there is some N such that ‘sF ¼ ‘sN . By Lemma 6, N ¼
U
M2FM. By Proposition 3, ‘sF ¼ ‘s#N . If the
matrices in F have classical negation and conjunction, so do the matrices in#N ¼#ðUM2FMÞ. By Lemma 9, F ¼ #N , in
contradiction to the assumption that F is not Cartesian. hExample 11. The family of matrices F in Example 9 (enriched with classical negation and conjunction) is not Cartesian and
so, by Propositions 2 and 5, it is not representable by a (ﬁnite) non-deterministic matrix.
The following theorem summarizes the relations among the different classes of logics deﬁned in this section.
Theorem 1. In the notations of Deﬁnition 13, we have that:
1. M ¼ DN \ SN,
2. M ¼ DN \ F,
3. SN ( F,
4. SG ¼ F,
5. DN å F,
6. DN ( DG,
7. F ( DG.Proof. We ﬁx a propositional language L.
1. Let L be an M-logic, induced by a matrix M. Let N be the corresponding (deterministic) Nmatrix. Obviously,
‘sN ¼ ‘dN ¼ ‘sM (recall Note 1), so L is both a DN-logic and an SN-logic. Now, let L 2 DN \ SN. LetN 1;N 2 be Nmatrices such
that ‘dN 1 ¼ ‘sN 2 ¼ ‘L. By Proposition 3, there is also a family of matrices F which induces L. Thus N 1 is fully deterministic
(if N 1 had at least one non-deterministic operation, then by Proposition 2 there would be no family of matrices inducing
L), and so ‘dN 1 ¼ ‘sN 1 ¼ ‘L (In addition, by Lemma 8, one concludes that N 1 ¼ N 2). Let M be the ordinary matrix corre-
sponding to N 1. Then L is induced by M, and so L is an M-logic.
2. By their deﬁnition, we have thatM#F andM#DN. Thus,M#F \DN. For the converse, suppose that L 2 DN and L 2 F. By
Proposition 2, L R DNM, and so L 2M.
3. By Proposition 3, SN#F. By Proposition 5, any F-logic that is induced by some non-Cartesian family of matrices with
negation and conjunction, is not an SN-logic (take, for instance, the family of matrices in Example 9 with the addition
of classical conjunction and negation). Thus, SN(F.
4. Every F-logic is also an SG-logic, by associating each matrix in F with a corresponding deterministic Nmatrix in G (see
Note 1). The fact that every SG-logic is an F-logic follows from Proposition 4.
5. Follows from Proposition 2.
6. Obviously, DN#DG. To see that the containment is proper, consider, for instance, the family G of Nmatrices from Example
10, where each of the matrices in G is extended with the standard classical implication for !. Suppose for contradiction
that there is some Nmatrix N , such that ‘dN ¼ ‘dG. Then it must be the case that }N ðt; fÞ ¼ }N ðf; tÞ ¼ ft; fg. Indeed, it is not
possible that }N ðt; fÞ ¼ ftg, as then ‘dN}ðt; fÞ, while 0dG}ðt; fÞ. By similar arguments, }N ðt; fÞ – ffg, }N ðf; tÞ – ftg, and
}N ðf; tÞ – ffg. This implies that 0dN}ðt; fÞ ! }ðf ; tÞ, while it holds that ‘dG}ðt; fÞ ! }ðf ; tÞ, in contradiction to our assump-
tion that ‘dN ¼ ‘dG.
7. Let L ¼ hL;‘Li be an F-logic. Then there are deterministic matricesM1; . . . ;Mk such that for every theory C and formula w
in WL;C ‘L w iff for all 1 6 i 6 k C ‘sMi w, iff (since the matrices are deterministic) for all 1 6 i 6 k;C ‘
d
Mi w, iff for all
1 6 i 6 k;C ‘dM0i w, whereM
0
i is a deterministic Nmatrix that corresponds toMi, iff C ‘dG w, where G ¼ fM01; . . . ;M0kg. Thus,
F#DG. The containment is proper by the facts that DN(DG (Item 6) and DN F – ; (Item 5). h
Fig. 3. The relations among the classes of logics in Deﬁnition 13.
O. Arieli, A. Zamansky / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 184–211 195Corollary 3. It holds that (1) M ( SN ( SGð¼ FÞ and (2) M ( DN ( DG.Proof
1. Weak containments follow from the deﬁnitions of the relevant logic classes. We show that the containments are proper:
IfM ¼ SN then in particular for every matrixM there is an NmatrixN such that ‘sM ¼ ‘sN . By either Lemma 6 (for the case
where F is a singleton) or by Lemma 8 (taking into consideration that a matrix is a particular kind of an Nmatrix), this
implies that N ¼M, which is not possible for a proper non-deterministic N . The fact that SN – SG follows from Items 3
and 4 of Theorem 1.
2. Again, weak containments directly follow from the deﬁnitions of the logic classes. For proper containments, note that if
M ¼ DN then by Item 5 of Theorem 1 we have thatMåFwhich is not possible (a matrix is a particular kind of a family of
matrices). The fact that DN– DG follows from Item 6 of Theorem 1. h
A graphical representation of the results in Theorem 1 and Corollary 3 is given in Fig. 3.
3. Distance-based semantics for dealing with inconsistency
3.1. Preferential semantics
A major drawback, in the context of reasoning under uncertainty, of the consequence relations induced by a denotational
semantics (see Deﬁnition 2 and Schema (1) below it), and in particular all of those considered in Section 2.2, is that they are
not inconsistency-tolerant in the sense that everything follows from inconsistent theories. Indeed, let S ¼ hS;Si be a deno-
tational semantics and C a theory. If C is not consistent, that is: the set modSðCÞ of its S-models is empty, then by (1), C ‘S w
for every formula w 2 WL.
In what follows we overcome the explosive nature of ‘S. For this, we look for entailment relations with the following
properties:
I FAITHFULNESS: coincides with ‘S with respect to S-consistent theories.10 For
:w.
11 Thi
proposi
classicaIf modSðCÞ– ; then for every w 2 WL;C ‘S w iff C w:
II NON-EXPLOSIVENESS: is not trivialized when the premises are not S-consistent.10If modSðCÞ ¼ ; then there is a formula w 2 WL such that C w:We are interested, then, in non-explosive relations that, for S-consistent sets of premises, coincide with ‘S. Such a rela-
tion is called an inconsistency-tolerant variant of ‘S.
Note that whenmodSðCÞ is non-empty for every theory C, it is enough to take ‘S, as property II vacuously holds.Yet, logics
of this kind are often too weak (e.g., in comparison to classical logic).11 Moreover, in the general case ‘S is explosive (as ex-
plained previously), thus Schema (1) has to be reﬁned. One way of doing so is to incorporate Shoham’s preferential semantics
[53]. The idea behind this approach is, given a denotational semantics S ¼ hS;i for L, to deﬁne an S-preferential operatorlanguages with a negation :, explosiveness usually means that the underlying logic is not paraconsistent [19]: any formula / can be inferred from w and
s is the case, for instance, in Priest’s three-valued logics for propositional languages LP [47], or in Belnap–Dunn’s four-valued logic for the standard
tional language [13], in both of which every theory is satisﬁable, and so the logics are non-explosive. However, these logics are strictly weaker than
l logic even with respect to classically consistent theories (for instance, they do not respect the Disjunctive Syllogism).
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WL ! 2S that relates a theory C with a set DsðCÞ of its ‘most preferred’ (or ‘most plausible’) elements in S. Then, the con-
sequences of C are determined by its most preferred elements rather than by its models (as in (1)). This is formalized in the
following schema:12 ThaC w if every element in DSðCÞ is also an S-model of w: ð4Þ
Proposition 6 now speciﬁes some simple conditions that guarantee that the entailments that are obtained by (4) would be
both non-explosive and faithful to ‘S with respect to consistent premises.
Proposition 6. Let S be a denotational semantics for a language L in which for every m 2 S there is some formula w 2 WL, such
that m2
S
w. Suppose that DS is a preferential operator for S and that is the entailment induced by DS as deﬁned in (4). If
1. DSðCÞ is non-empty for every C, and
2. DSðCÞ ¼ modSðCÞ whenever modSðCÞ is not empty,
then is an inconsistency-tolerant variant of ‘S.Proof. Faithfulness to ‘S follows from Condition (2); Non-explosiveness follows from the requirement on S and from Con-
dition (1). hCorollary 4. Let S be a denotational semantics for a language L that has a contradictory formula.12 Suppose that is an entail-
ment relation induced by a preferential operator DS as in (4) and that DS meets both of the conditions in Proposition 6. Then is an
inconsistency-tolerant variant of ‘S.Proof. If S has a contradictory formula ?S then in particular m2S?S for every m 2 S. Thus, by Proposition 6, is an inconsis-
tency-tolerant variant of ‘S. h
Proposition 6 and Corollary 4 show that in many cases faithfulness and non-explosiveness can be obtained from a given
denotational semantics S ¼ hS;i by a proper choice of a preferential operator DS. In the sequel we therefore follow this ap-
proach, applying the following two general assumptions:
1. the denotational semantics is based on matrices and the corresponding semantic structures are those considered in
Section 2.2,
2. the preference among valuations is speciﬁed in terms of distance considerations, as deﬁned in the next sections.
In Section 5 we elaborate on the extension of the framework to other types of denotational semantics (such as possible
worlds semantics).
3.2. Distance semantics
In what follows we use distance considerations as our primary criterion for making preferences among valuations in a
matrix-based (denotational) semantics. This is a common technique for drawing conclusions from inconsistent sets of
assumptions, most notably in the areas of belief revision [14,26,29,42] and data integration [4,37,43]. The idea is simple: gi-
ven a distance function on a space of valuations, we deﬁne a distance-like measurement d, between valuations and theories.
Now, for making conclusions from a theory C, we use, instead of its set of models, which may be empty, the set of valuations
that are ‘d-closest’ to C (the most plausible valuations of C), which is always non-empty. In terms of the previous section, the
latter is the set DSðCÞ, determined by distance minimization. Below are two simple examples that demonstrate the main
idea:
Example 12. Consider a language with negation, i.e., with a unary connective : interpreted in the standard way.1. It is intuitively clear that valuations in which q is true should be closer to C ¼ fp;:p; qg than valuations in which q is false,
and so q should follow from C while :q should not follow from C, although C is not consistent.
2. Suppose that in a poll about a query q, two experts vote ‘yes’ and one votes ‘no’. The goal is therefore to draw plausible
conclusions based on the theories C1 ¼ fqg; C2 ¼ fqg, and C3 ¼ f:qg. This time, distance considerations may be repre-
sented by a majority-vote function (see [5,37]), according to which valuations that validate q are more plausible than
those that falsify q. This implies that in this case, again, q should be entailed while :q should not.t is, a formula ?S 2 WL for which modSð?SÞ ¼ ;.
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semantics in [5]. In what follows, we generalize this method and extend it to all the semantic structures of Section 2.2.
We also introduce some new general methods for constructing distances and, accordingly, for deﬁning new distance-based
entailments.
3.3. Distances between valuations
We start by extending the notion of ‘distance between valuations’ to the context of the semantic structures presented
previously.
Deﬁnition 15 (Distance functions). A pseudo distance on a set S is a total function d : S S! Rþ, satisfying the following
conditions:
– symmetry: for all m;l 2 S; dðm;lÞ ¼ dðl; mÞ,
– identity preservation: for all m;l 2 S; dðm;lÞ ¼ 0 iff m ¼ l.
A pseudo distance d is a distance (metric) on S if it has the following property:
– triangular inequality: for all m;l;r 2 S; dðm;rÞ 6 dðm;lÞ þ dðl;rÞ.
In our context, (pseudo-) distances serve as a quantitative measurement for the similarity between M-valuations.
Example 13. The following functions are two common distances on the space of the two-valued valuations in the classical
matrix. The second function is deﬁned under the assumption that the set of atoms in the language is ﬁnite:
– The drastic (uniform) distance: dUðm;lÞ ¼ 0 if m ¼ l and dUðm;lÞ ¼ 1 otherwise.
– The Hamming distance: dHðm;lÞ ¼ jfp 2 AtomsjmðpÞ– lðpÞgj.
We will show below (Note 3) that these distances can be applied on any space of static valuations.
In the context of non-deterministic semantic structures, one needs to be more cautious in deﬁning distances among val-
uations. Recall that two dynamic valuations can agree on all the atoms of a complex formula, but still assign two different
values to that formula. So the functions dU and dH in Example 13 may no longer be distances, or even pseudo distances on a
space of dynamic valuations. It follows, then, that complex formulas should also be taken into account in the distance def-
initions. However, there are inﬁnitely many of them to consider. To handle this, we restrict the distance computations to
some context, that is: to a certain set of relevant formulas. As a result, unlike e.g. in [1,2,37] and other frameworks that
use distances such as those of Example 13, we will not need the rather restricting assumption that the set of atoms is ﬁnite.
Deﬁnition 16 (Contexts and restrictions). A context C is a ﬁnite set of L-formulas closed under subformulas. The restriction to
C of a valuation m 2 KxM is a valuation m#C on C, such that m#CðwÞ ¼ mðwÞ for every w in C. The restriction to C of KxM is the set
Kx#CM ¼ fm#Cjm 2 KxMg.
Distances between valuations are now deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 17 (Generic distances). LetM be a semantic structure, x 2 fd;sg, and d a function on SfC¼SFðCÞjCis a theory inLgKx#CM 
Kx#CM .
– The restriction of d to a context C is a function d#C on Kx#CM  Kx#CM , deﬁned for every m;l 2 Kx#CM by d#Cðm;lÞ ¼ dðm;lÞ.
– We say that d is a generic (pseudo) distance on KxM if for every context C; d
#C is a (pseudo) distance on Kx#CM .
General constructions of generic distances
Below, we introduce a general method of constructing generic distances. These constructions include, in particular, the
distance functions of Example 13 as particular cases of generic distances, restricted to the context C ¼ Atoms (see Note 3 be-
low). For this, we ﬁrst need the notion of aggregation functions:
Deﬁnition 18 (Aggregation functions). A numeric aggregation function is a complete mapping g from multisets of real
numbers to real numbers, such that
– g is non-decreasing in the values of the elements of its argument,
– gðfx1; . . . ; xngÞ ¼ 0 iff x1 ¼ x2 ¼ . . . xn ¼ 0,
– gðfxgÞ ¼ x for every x 2 R.
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in Deﬁnition 18 are, e.g., summation, average, the maximal function, etc.
Deﬁnition 19 (r andﬄ). LetM be a (two-valued) semantic structure, C a context, and x 2 fd;sg. For every w 2 C, deﬁne the
function ﬄw : Kx#CM Kx#CM ! f0;1g by an induction on the structure of formulas as follows:
– for v1; v2 2 ft; fg, rðv1;v2Þ ¼ 0 if v1 ¼ v2 and rðv1;v2Þ ¼ 1 otherwise,
– for an atomic formula p, let ﬄpðm;lÞ ¼ rðmðpÞ;lðpÞÞ,
– for a formula w ¼ }ðw1; . . . ;wnÞ, deﬁneﬄwðm;lÞ ¼ 1 if mðwÞ– lðwÞ but 8i mðwiÞ ¼ lðwiÞ;
0 otherwise:
Deﬁnition 20 (Distance constructors). Let M be a two-valued semantic structure, C a context, x 2 fd;sg, and g an aggrega-
tion function. Deﬁne the following functions from Kx#CM Kx#CM to Rþ:
– d#Cr;gðm;lÞ ¼ g frðmðwÞ;lðwÞÞjw 2 Cgð Þ,
– d#Cﬄ;gðm;lÞ ¼ g fﬄwðm;lÞjw 2 Cgð Þ.
The difference between d#Cr;g and d
#C
ﬄ;g is in the treatment of the non-deterministic choices made by the valuations. This is
demonstrated in the following example.
Example 14. Consider an Nmatrix N with ~:N ðtÞ ¼ ft; fg and ~:N ðfÞ ¼ ftg, and the following valuations in Kd#CN for
C ¼ fp;:p;::pg:m1ðpÞ ¼ t; m1ð:pÞ ¼ f; m1ð::pÞ ¼ t
m2ðpÞ ¼ t; m2ð:pÞ ¼ t; m2ð::pÞ ¼ f
m3ðpÞ ¼ f; m3ð:pÞ ¼ t; m3ð::pÞ ¼ tUsing d#Cr;R, all the valuations are equally distant from each other, as they differ in exactly two assignments:d#Cr;Rðm1; m2Þ ¼ d#Cr;Rðm1; m3Þ ¼ d#Cr;Rðm2; m3Þ ¼ 2:
Using d#Cﬄ;R, however, the situation is different, asd#Cﬄ;Rðm1; m2Þ ¼ d#Cﬄ;Rðm1; m3Þ ¼ 1; but d#Cﬄ;Rðm2; m3Þ ¼ 2:
This may be explained by the fact that m1 and m2 make one different choice (in the transition from p to :p) and so are m1 and
m3 (in the initial value of p), while m2 and m3 make two different choices (in the initial value of p and in the transition from :p
to ::p). So, while dr;g compares truth assignments, dﬄ;g compares (initial and non-deterministic) choices.Note 3. The distances from Example 13 are speciﬁc instances of the distances obtained by the methods above:
– Both dr;max and dﬄ;max are natural extensions of the drastic distance dU: For a deterministic matrixMwe have that, for any
m;l 2 KsM and any ﬁnite set Atoms,dUðm;lÞ ¼ d#Atomsr;maxðm;lÞ ¼ d#Atomsﬄ;maxðm;lÞ:
– Both dr;R and dﬄ;R are natural extensions of the Hamming distance dH: For a deterministic matrixMwe have that, for any
m;l 2 KsM and any ﬁnite set Atoms,dHðm;lÞ ¼ d#Atomsr;R ðm;lÞ ¼ d#Atomsﬄ;R ðm;lÞ:
Next, we show that the functions in Deﬁnition 20 indeed induce corresponding generic distances.
Proposition 7. For every semantic structure M, context C;x 2 fd;sg, and aggregation function g, both of d#Cr;g and d#Cﬄ;g are
pseudo-distances on Kx#CM .Proof. Consider d#Cﬄ;g ﬁrst. Symmetry is obvious. For identity preservation, note that d
#C
ﬄ;g ¼ 0 iff gðfﬄwðm;lÞjw 2 CgÞ ¼ 0, iff
ﬄwðm;lÞ ¼ 0 for every w 2 C, iff (by induction on the structure of w) mðwÞ ¼ lðwÞ for every w 2 C, iff m#C ¼ l#C.
The proof for d#Cr;g is similar (and even simpler, as for identity preservation induction is not required). h
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Proposition 8. Let g beanaggregation function.Deﬁne, for every contextC;x 2 fd;sg, andm;l 2 Kx#CM , the functionsdr;g anddﬄ;g bydr;gðm;lÞ ¼ g frðmðwÞ;lðwÞÞjw 2 Cgð Þ; ð5Þ
dﬄ;gðm;lÞ ¼ g fﬄwðm;lÞjw 2 Cg
 
: ð6ÞThen dr;g and dﬄ;g are generic pseudo distances on K
x
M.3.4. Entailments based on pseudo-distances
The distances between valuations, considered in the previous section, are the basis for the distance-based entailments,
deﬁned in this section (see also [1,5]).
Deﬁnition 21 (Settings). A (semantical) setting for a language L is a tuple S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ; f i, whereM is any of the semantic
structures considered in Section 2.2, d is a generic pseudo distance on KxM for some x 2 fd;sg, and f is an aggregation
function.
A setting identiﬁes the underlying semantics of the framework. A given setting can be used for measuring the correspon-
dence between valuations and formulas, and between valuations and theories.
Deﬁnition 22. Given a setting S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ; f i for a language L, deﬁne for every valuation m 2 KxM, theory C ¼ fw1; . . . ;wng
in L, and context C,
– d#Cðm;wiÞ ¼ minfd
#Cðm#C;l#CÞjl 2 modxMðwiÞg if modxMðwiÞ – ;;
1þmaxfd#Cðl#C1 ;l#C2 Þjl1;l2 2 KxMg otherwise:
(
.
– d#Cd;f ðm;CÞ ¼ f ðfd#Cðm;w1Þ; . . . ; d#Cðm;wnÞgÞ.
The intuition behind Deﬁnition 22 is to measure how ‘close’ a valuation is to satisfy a formula and a theory. Note that in
the two extreme degenerate cases, when w is either an M-tautology or an M-contradiction, all the valuations are equally
distant from w.
In order to be faithful to the intuition described here, the distance between a formula and each one of its models should be
zero, while the distance between a formula and any other valuation should be strictly positive. Hence, we are interested in
the following property:
Proposition 9. LetM be a semantic structure, C a context, and x 2 fd;sg. For every formula w in C and for all m 2 KxM, we have
that d#Cðm;wÞ ¼ 0 iff m 2 modxMðwÞ.Proof. One direction is trivial. For the other direction, let m 2 KxM such that d#Cðm;wÞ ¼ 0. Then there is some l 2 modxMðwÞ
such that d#Cðm#C;l#CÞ ¼ 0. Since d#C is a pseudo distance on KxM, necessarily m#C ¼ l#C. As w 2 C; mðwÞ ¼ lðwÞ, and so
m 2 modxMðwÞ. hCorollary 5. Let S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ; f i be a semantic setting, C a context, and x 2 fd;sg. For every theory C#C and for all m 2 KxM, we
have that d#Cd;f ðm;CÞ ¼ 0 iff m 2 modxMðCÞ.Proof. By Proposition 9 and Deﬁnition 22. h
As contexts are closed under subformulas, the last corollary implies that the most appropriate contexts to use are those
that include all the subformulas of the premises, that is: for a set C of premises we evaluate distances with respect to the
context C ¼ SFðCÞ.
Deﬁnition 23 (Most plausible valuations). The most plausible valuations of C with respect to a semantic setting
S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ; f i are the elements of the following set:DSðCÞ ¼
m 2 KxMj8l 2 KxM d#SFðCÞd;f ðm;CÞ 6 d#SFðCÞd;f ðl;CÞ
n o
if C– ;;
KxM otherwise:
(
The intuition behind the last deﬁnition is to refer to the valuations that are closest to a theory C as the ones that are the
most faithful to C.
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aggregation function, andN is an Nmatrix that interprets} according to the truth table of Example 3 and interprets negation
in the standard (deterministic) way. Let C ¼ fp; q;:ðp}qÞg. This theory is not satisﬁable by any dynamic N -valuation. Let us
compute its most plausible valuations. Denote C ¼ SFðCÞ.p q p } q :ðp } qÞ d#Cr;Rðmi; pÞ d#Cr;Rðmi; qÞ d#Cr;Rðmi;:ðp } qÞÞ d#CS1 ðmi;CÞ
m1 t t t f 0 0 3 3
m2 t f t f 0 1 2 3
m3 t f f t 0 2 0 2
m4 f t t f 1 0 2 3
m5 f t f t 2 0 0 2
m6 f f f t 1 1 0 2
It follows, then, that DS1 ðCÞ ¼ fm3; m5; m6g. Consider now S2 ¼ hN ; ðdﬄ;R;dÞ;Ri, where dﬄ;R is a generic distance, deﬁned in (6)
using the summation aggregation function, and N is the same Nmatrix as before. For the same theory C we now have:
p q p } q :ðp } qÞ d#Cﬄ;Rðmi; pÞ d#Cﬄ;Rðmi; qÞ d#Cﬄ;Rðmi;:ðp}qÞÞ d#CS2 ðmi;CÞ
m1 t t t f 0 0 1 1
m2 t f t f 0 1 1 2
m3 t f f t 0 1 0 1
m4 f t t f 1 0 1 2
m5 f t f t 1 0 0 1
m6 f f f t 1 1 0 2So this time DS2 ðCÞ ¼ fm1; m3; m5g.
The next propositions generalize similar results in [1,5] and guarantee, respectively, Conditions (1) and (2) in Proposition 6.
Proposition 10. For any setting S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ; f i and theory C, DSðCÞ is not empty.Proof. By a direct generalization of [5, Lemma 1] to the semantic structures considered in Section 2.2 (the proof in [5] refers
only to Nmatrices with dynamic semantics). hProposition 11. For any setting S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ; f i and an M-satisﬁable theory C;DSðCÞ ¼ modxMðCÞ.Proof. By Corollary 5. h
Now we are ready to deﬁne entailment relations based on distance minimization. The following deﬁnition formalizes the
idea that, according to such entailments, conclusions should follow from all of the most plausible valuations of the premises.
Note that this deﬁnition is a particular case, for matrices and pseudo-distances, of the schema (4) considered previously.
Deﬁnition 24 (Entailments based on pseudo-distances). Let S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ; f i be a setting. Denote: C w if DSðCÞ#modxMðwÞ.Example 16. Consider again Example 15. Under the standard interpretation of the disjunction, we have that C :p _ :q
while C :p _ :q.Example 17. Consider again the family of matrices F given in Example 9 and the F -consistent theory13 In t
d#SFðC
0 Þ
dr;R ;R
ðC ¼ fout1 $ ðin1 ^ in2Þ _ in1; out2 $ ðin1 ^ in2Þ } in3g
that represents the circuit of Fig. 1 (Example 1). Suppose now that we learn that the input line in1 and the output line out1
always have opposite values. The revised theory, C0 ¼ C [ fout1 $ :in1g, is not F -satisﬁable anymore, so ‘F is useless for
making plausible conclusions from C0. Consider now the setting S ¼ hF ; ðdr;R;sÞ;Ri. The distances between the elements
of KsF and C
0 are computed in Table 1. 13 It follows that:his table, we denote: w1 ¼ out1 $ ðin1 ^ in2Þ _ in1, / ¼ ðin1 ^ in2Þ}in3, w2 ¼ out2 $ /, and w3 ¼ out1 $ :in1. Thus, C0 ¼ fw1;w2;w3g. Also, we abbreviate
mi;C0Þ by dSðmi;C0Þ. Valuations with ‘ a’ in their subscript interpret } by ~}1 and valuations with ‘ b’ in their subscript interpret } by ~}2.
Table 1
Distances for KsF and C
0 with respect to S ¼ hF ; ðdr;R ;sÞ;Ri (Example 17).
in1 in2 in3 out1 out2 / w2 dr;Rðmi;w1Þ dr;Rðmi;w2Þ dr;Rðmi;w3Þ dSðmi;C0Þ
m1 t t t t t t t 0 0 3 3
m2 t t t t f t f 0 2 3 5
m3 t t t f t t t 3 0 0 3
m4 t t t f f t f 3 2 0 5
m5a t t f t t t t 0 0 3 3
m5b t t f t t f f 0 2 3 5
m6a t t f t f t f 0 2 3 5
m6b t t f t f f t 0 0 3 3
m7a t t f f t t t 3 0 0 3
m7b t t f f t f f 3 2 0 5
m8a t t f f f t f 3 2 0 5
m8b t t f f f f t 3 0 0 3
m9a t f t t t t t 0 0 3 3
m9b t f t t t f f 0 2 3 5
m10a t f t t f t f 0 2 3 5
m10b t f t t f f t 0 0 3 3
m11a t f t f t t t 3 0 0 3
m11b t f t f t f f 3 2 0 5
m12a t f t f f t f 3 2 0 5
m12b t f t f f f t 3 0 0 3
m13 t f f t t f f 0 2 3 5
m14 t f f t f f t 0 0 3 3
m15 t f f f t f f 3 2 0 5
m16 t f f f f f t 3 0 0 3
m17a f t t t t t t 3 0 0 3
m17b f t t t t f f 3 2 0 5
m18a f t t t f t f 3 2 0 5
m18b f t t t f f t 3 0 0 3
m19a f t t f t t t 0 0 3 3
m19b f t t f t f f 0 2 3 5
m20a f t t f f t f 0 2 3 5
m20b f t t f f f t 0 0 3 3
m21 f t f t t f f 3 2 0 5
m22 f t f t f f t 3 0 0 3
m23 f t f f t f f 0 2 3 5
m24 f t f f f f t 0 0 3 3
m25a f f t t t t t 3 0 0 3
m25b f f t t t f f 3 2 0 5
m26a f f t t f t f 3 2 0 5
m26b f f t t f f t 3 0 0 3
m27a f f t f t t t 0 0 3 3
m27b f f t f t f f 0 2 3 5
m28a f f t f f t f 0 2 3 5
m28b f f t f f f t 0 0 3 3
m29 f t f t t f f 3 2 0 5
m30 f t f t f f t 3 0 0 3
m31 f t f f t f f 0 2 3 5
m32 f t f f f f t 0 0 3 3
m33 f f f t t f f 3 2 0 5
m34 f f f t f f t 3 0 0 3
m35 f f f f t f f 0 2 3 5
m36 f f f f f f t 0 0 3 3
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e.g., while C ‘F out1 $ in1, we have that C0 out1 $ in1.
– The other assertion in C, out2 $ ðin1 ^ in2Þ } in3, is validated by all the most plausible valuations of C0, and so, despite the
F -inconsistency of C0, the reasoner may retain its knowledge about the relations between the value of the output line out2
and the values of the input lines in1 and in2.It is interesting to check to what extent our formalism is sensitive to syntactic differences in the representation of the
assertions. For this, let S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ; f i be a given setting.
1. First note that, as follows from Proposition 12 below, every twoM-consistent theories that are logically equivalent with
respect to ‘xM (that is, have the same M-models) share the same -conclusions.
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under logical equivalence when the set of premises is notM-consistent. Thus, for instance, in certain settings the theories
C1 ¼ fp ^ q;:p _ :qg and C2 ¼ fp; q;:p _ :qg do not have the same -consequences. Indeed, while in classical logic (and
in many other standard logics as well) inconsistent theories are all logically equivalent, any deﬁnition of most plausible
valuations that makes a distinction among inconsistent theories cannot preserve logical equivalence, but employs some
other considerations. This is also acknowledged by several methods for resolving inconsistencies based on information
and inconsistency measures. Indeed, according to different measures that are used in the literature (see, e.g.,
[22,30,31]), both the amount of information and the amount of inconsistency in C1 and in C2 above are not the same. 14
3. Despite the sensitivity to syntactical modiﬁcations, indicated in the previous item, it can be shown that some particular
approaches to distance-based reasoning are invariant with respect to more restricted notions of logical equivalence. For
this, consider the following deﬁnition.15
Deﬁnition 25 (Bi-equivalence). A theory C is bijection-equivalent (bi-equivalent) to C0 with respect to V#KxM, if there is a
bijection r : C! C0, such that for all w 2 C, modxMðwÞ \ V ¼ modxMðrðwÞÞ \ V.
For instance, according to the two-valued matrixM¼ hft; fg; ftg; f ~^; ~_; ~:gi that interprets ^;_ and : in the standard way,
we have that, with respect to KsM, the theory C1 considered in the previous item is not bi-equivalent to C2, but it is bi-equiv-
alent to C3 ¼ f:ð:p _ :qÞ;:p _ :qg.
Example 18. Let S ¼ hM; ðd;sÞ;Ri, where M¼ hft; fg; ftg; f ~^; ~:gi is a two-valued matrix that interprets ^ and : in the
standard way, and d is the uniform distance (or the Hamming distance). Consider a mediator system that collects
information from distributed sources (say, sensor indications about trafﬁc loads), and the following three theories:14 For
fw1^; . .
15 Thi
16 Thi
17 WhC1 ¼ BusyðRoad1Þ ^ :BusyðRoad1Þ ^ BusyðRoad2Þf g;
C2 ¼ BusyðRoad1Þ ^ BusyðRoad2Þ;:BusyðRoad1Þ ^ BusyðRoad2Þf g;
C3 ¼ :ClearðRoad1Þ ^ :ClearðRoad2Þ; ClearðRoad1Þ ^ :ClearðRoad2Þf g:Intuitively, C1 represents a situation in which there is one unreliable sensor (sending contradictory indications about Road1).
On the other hand, C2 integrates contradictory information coming from two reliable sources (the conjunctive information
received from each source by itself is consistent). Thus, in the ﬁrst case, one may want to rule out any indication coming from
the malfunctioning sensor (including that Road2 is busy). In the second case, however, the reliable sensors disagree about
Road1 (perhaps due to different thresholds regarding ‘load’), but both of them do agree that Road2 is busy, so this may be
a safe conclusion of C2, despite of its inconsistency.
This state of affairs is also supported by our distance-based framework. Indeed, as C1 consists of a single unsatisﬁable
formula, according to S all the valuations in KsM are equally distant from C1. On the other hand, in C2 both of the formulas
are satisﬁable, thus valuations in KsM in which BusyðRoad2Þ is satisﬁed are ‘‘closer” to C2 than those in which BusyðRoad2Þ is
falsiﬁed.
Let’s consider now C3. By the same considerations as before, we have that C3 implies :ClearðRoad2Þ. This is not surprising
since, in fact, C3 represents the same situation as the one depicted by C2, using a different terminology. Under the
assumption W ¼ 8xðBusyðxÞ $ :ClearðxÞÞ, then, C2 and C3 coincide.16 Indeed, we have that C2 and C3 are bi-equivalent with
respect to modsMðWÞ, while neither of them is bi-equivalent to C1 (with respect to modsMðWÞ).Lemma 10. Let dU and dH be the distance functions deﬁned in Note 3. If C and C0 are bi-equivalent with respect to KsM for a deter-
ministic matrixM, then for every ﬁnite set Atoms, distance d 2 fdU ; dHg, aggregation function f, and valuation m 2 KsM, it holds that
d#Atomsd;f ðm;CÞ ¼ d#Atomsd;f ðm;C0Þ.Proof. Let C and C0 be bi-equivalent theories with respect to KsM, and let r be a corresponding bijection between them. Then
for every w 2 C, modsMðwÞ ¼ modsMðrðwÞÞ, and so, for every m 2 KsM, d#Atomsðm;wÞ ¼ d#Atomsðm;rðwÞÞ. Thus, for every m 2 KsM and
aggregation function f, d#Atomsd;f ðm;CÞ ¼ d#Atomsd;f ðm;C0Þ. h
By Lemma 10, then, the distance-based operators Df (for f ¼ R or f ¼ max with d as the Hamming or the drastic dis-
tances), introduced in [37], and the corresponding entailments in [1] (all of which draw conclusions from a theory C by
the valuations m for which d#Atomsd;f ðm;CÞ is minimal), are examples for distance-based formalisms that are invariant with
respect to bi-equivalent theories.17instance, a characteristic property of the inconsistency measure deﬁned in [22] is that the set of formulas fw1; . . . ;wng is not equivalent to the singleton
. ;^wng. This property is typical to a special class of paraconsistent logics, known as non-adjunctive logics (see [36]).
s deﬁnition is an extension of a similar notion introduced in [35] (see also [7]).
s assumption is in fact a conjunction of a (ﬁnite number of) propositional formulas, so ultimately we are still on the propositional level.
ere bi-equivalence is taken with respect to the whole space of valuations.
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in the context of deterministic matrices. This includes, among others, the belief revision and merging operators considered in
[37,43,51], and the distance-based entailments for deterministic matrices in [1,7] that are represented by , where
S ¼ hM; ðd;sÞ; f i is a setting in whichM is the classical deterministic matrix. The entailment for Nmatrices and dynamic
valuations is studied in [5]. Distance-based entailments for Nmatrices and static valuations, as well as entailments based on
families of matrices and (static or dynamic) Nmatrices, have not been considered elsewhere (apart of [6], the reduced version
of this paper).3.5. Some basic properties of
In this section we study some basic properties of the entailment relations deﬁned above. Our ﬁrst observation is that the
distance-based entailment (Deﬁnition 24) coincides with the consequence relation ‘xM (Deﬁnitions 5, 8, 9 and 12) when-
ever the theory is M-consistent.
Proposition 12. Given a setting S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ; f i, it holds that for every M-consistent theory C and every formula w, C w iff
C ‘xM w.Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Proposition 11. h
More generally, we have the following results:
Proposition 13. Given a setting S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ; f i for a language L in which for every m 2 KxM there is a formula w 2 WL, such that
m R modxMðwÞ. Then is an inconsistency-tolerant variant of ‘xM.Proof. By Propositions 6, 10 and 11. h
By the last proposition, in particular, if S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ; f i is a setting for a language L that has a contradictory formula, then
is an inconsistency-tolerant variant of ‘xM.
Note that the entailment is not a consequence relation. In fact, as shown in [1,5], each property in Deﬁnition 1 may be
violated already in settings with deterministic matrices. This is also veriﬁable by the examples in this paper. For instance,
Example 17 shows that is neither reﬂexive nor monotonic (indeed, let w ¼ out1 $ ðin1 ^ in2Þ _ in1, then C0 w although
w 2 C0 and C w).
In the context of non-monotonic reasoning, however, it is usual to consider the following weaker conditions that guar-
antee a ‘proper behaviour’ of non-monotonic entailments in the presence of inconsistency (see, e.g., [3,38,41,44]):
Deﬁnition 26 (Cautious consequence relations). A cautious consequence relation for L is a binary relation between sets of
formulas in WL and formulas in WL, satisfying the following conditions:
Cautious Reﬂexivity (w.r.t. M): if C is M-satisﬁable and w 2 C, then C w.18
Cautious Monotonicity [25]: if C w and C /, then C;w /.
Cautious Transitivity [38]: if C w and C;w /, then C /.Deﬁnition 27 (Hereditary functions). An aggregation function f is hereditary if for every z1; . . . ; zm it holds that
f ðfx1; . . . ; xn; z1; . . . ; zmgÞ < f ðfy1; . . . ; yn; z1; . . . ; zmgÞ whenever f ðfx1; . . . ; xngÞ < f ðfy1; . . . ; yngÞ.Example 19. Summation is hereditary, while the maximum function is not.Theorem 2. Let S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ; f i be a setting where f is hereditary. Then is a cautious consequence relation.Proof. Cautious reﬂexivity follows from Proposition 12. The proofs of the two other properties are an adaptation of the ones
for the deterministic case (see [1]):
For cautious monotonicity, let C ¼ fc1; . . . ; cng and suppose that C w;C /, and m 2 DSðC [ fwgÞ. We show that
m 2 DSðCÞ and since C / this implies that m 2 modxMðf/gÞ. Indeed, if m R DSðCÞ, there is a valuation l 2 DSðCÞ so that
dd;f ðl;CÞ < dd;f ðm;CÞ, i.e., f ðfdðl; c1Þ; . . . ; dðl; cnÞgÞ < f ðfdðm; c1Þ; . . . ; dðm; cnÞgÞ. Also, as C w;l 2 modxMðfwgÞ, thus
dðl;wÞ ¼ 0. By these facts, and since f is hereditary, then,18 In the context of non-monotonic formalisms, cautious reﬂexivity usually does not involve satisﬁability; We require this condition as distance-based
entailments are very cautious with respect to contradictory premises. Indeed, w w when w is a contradiction.
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¼ dd;f ðm;C [ fwgÞ;a contradiction to m 2 DSðC [ fwgÞ.
For cautious transitivity, let again C ¼ fc1; . . . ; cng and assume that C w;C;w /, and m 2 DSðCÞ. We have to show that
m 2 modxMðf/gÞ. Indeed, since m 2 DSðCÞ, for all l 2 KxM, f ðfdðm; c1Þ; . . . ; dðm; cnÞgÞ 6 f ðfdðl; c1Þ; . . . ; dðl; cnÞgÞ. Moreover, since
C w; m 2 modxMðfwgÞ, and so dðm;wÞ ¼ 0 6 dðl;wÞ. It follows, then, that for every l 2 KxM,dd;f ðm;C [ fwgÞ ¼ f ðfdðm; c1Þ; . . . ;dðm; cnÞ; dðm;wÞgÞ 6 f ðfdðl; c1Þ; . . . ;dðl; cnÞ; dðm;wÞgÞ
6 f ðfdðl; c1Þ; . . . ;dðl; cnÞ; dðl;wÞgÞ ¼ dd;f ðl;C [ fwgÞ:Thus, m 2 DSðC [ fwgÞ, and since C;w /, necessarily m 2 modxMðf/gÞ. h4. Reasoning with
In this section we investigate some computational aspects of reasoning with . The results below extend those in [7]
from the standard classical matrix to all the types of semantic structures discussed in this paper.
First, we consider decidability. In what follows we shall assume that the underlying setting S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ; f i is comput-
able, that is: there is an effective way to compute d and f. This is not sufﬁcient for decidability, though, as in order to decide
whether C w one needs to check whether DSðCÞ#modxMðwÞ and both of these sets may not be ﬁnite. To show that the deci-
sion problem regarding an S-entailment is decidable and effectively computable, we must show that the condition above can
be reduced to an equivalent condition in terms of ﬁnite sets of partial valuations. This is indeed the case, because of the prop-
erties of analycity, i.e., the ability to extend partial valuations to full valuations, and, in the other way around, unbiasedness,
which is concerned with reducing full valuations to partial valuations without losing meaningful information:
Proposition 14 (Analycity). Given a semantic structure M, for every context C;x 2 fd;sg, and valuation m 2 Kx#CM , there is a
valuation l 2 KxM, such that lðwÞ ¼ mðwÞ for all w 2 C.Proposition 15 (Unbiasedness). Given a setting S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ; f i, for every m1; m2 2 KxM, theory C, formula w 2 C, and context C
such that SFðCÞ#C, if m#C1 ¼ m#C2 then d#Cðm1;wÞ ¼ d#Cðm2;wÞ and d#Cd;f ðm1;CÞ ¼ d#Cd;f ðm2;CÞ.
Both of the propositions above are straightforward. Unbiasedness guarantees that only ﬁnite portions of valuations (those
that are relevant to the speciﬁed context) affect their distances to formulas and theories. This implies that the decision prob-
lem regarding can be formalized in terms of distances between ﬁnite partial valuations, as shown next.
Deﬁnition 28. For a setting S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ; f i and a context C, we denote:
modx#CM ðwÞ ¼ fm#Cjm 2 modxMðwÞg;
D#CS ðCÞ ¼ fm#Cjm 2 DSðCÞg:Proposition 16. Let S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ; f i be a setting. For every theory C and formula w, DSðCÞ#modxMðwÞ iff
D#SFðCÞS ðCÞ#modx#SFðwÞM ðwÞ.Proof. By Propositions 14 and 15. hCorollary 6. Let S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ; f i be a setting. For every theory C and formula w, C w iff D#SFðCÞS ðCÞ#modx#SFðwÞM ðwÞ.
As the sets in Corollary 6 are ﬁnite, they are effectively computable whenever the setting S is computable. It follows, then,
that
Theorem 3 (Decidability). For a computable setting S, the question whether C w is decidable for any ﬁnite theory C and any
formula w.
In what follows we shall describe some basic algorithms for reasoning with distance semantics using distance spheres (see
[29]). To simplify the presentation, we assume that all the distances that are involved are speciﬁed by natural numbers.
Deﬁnition 29 (Spheres). Let S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ; f i be a setting and C a context. For i 2 N, the i-th sphere of wwith respect to S and
C is the set
19 In
k ¼ max
O. Arieli, A. Zamansky / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 184–211 205R#CS ðw; iÞ ¼ fl 2 Kx#CM j9m 2 modxMðwÞ d#Cðl; mÞ 6 ig:R#CS ðw; iÞ is the ‘sphere’ of all the static/dynamicM-valuations on C whose distance from w is bounded by i. In particular,
R#CS ðw;0Þ ¼ modx#CM ðwÞ.
The following property will be useful in what follows:
Lemma 11. Let S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ; f i be a setting and C ¼ fw1; . . . ;wng a theory such that all its elements areM-satisﬁable. Then for
every context C there is some kP 0, such that
T
16i6nR#CS ðwi; kÞ – ;.Proof. In terms of set inclusion, for every w the sequence R#CS ðw; iÞ is non-decreasing in the ‘radius’ i. Moreover, for everyM-
satisﬁable w it holds that R#CS ðw; kÞ ¼ Kx#CM for k ¼ maxfd#Cðl; mÞjl; m 2 Kx#CM g (and if w is notM-satisﬁable, R#CS ðw; iÞ ¼ ; for all
i). As every wi in C is M-satisﬁable,
T
16i6nR#CS ðwi; kÞ ¼ Kx#CM . 19 h
By Corollary 6, it is sufﬁcient to compute D#SFðCÞS ðCÞ. In the rest of this section we consider two common cases in which
D#SFðCÞS ðCÞ can be characterized using a minimal non-empty intersection of spheres.
4.1. MinMax reasoning
Consider settings with the maximum aggregation function. Reasoning with such settings can be thought of as a min–max
approach: minimization of maximal distances. This is a skeptical approach, as it takes into account the best options (minimal
values) among the worst cases (maximal distances). In this case, the set of the most plausible valuations of a given theory can
be characterized as follows:
Proposition 17. For a setting S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ;maxi and a theory C ¼ fw1; . . . ;wng,D#SFðCÞS ðCÞ ¼
T
16i6n
R#SFðCÞS ðwi;mCS Þ if all the formulas in C are satisfiable;
Kx#SFðCÞM if there is a non-satisfiable formula in C;
8<:
where mCS is the minimal number m 2 N for which
T
16i6nR#SFðCÞS ðwi;mÞ is not empty.Proof. Let C ¼ SFðCÞ. Suppose, ﬁrst, that there is some w 2 C that is not M-satisﬁable. Then for every l 2 Kx#CM ; dðl;wÞ ¼
1þmaxfd#Cðl; mÞjl; m 2 Kx#CM g. Thus, for all l1;l2 2 Kx#CM it holds that dd;maxðl1;CÞ ¼ dd;maxðl2;CÞ, and so D#CS ðCÞ ¼ Kx#CM .
Supposenowthat all the formulas inCareM-satisﬁable.By Lemma11, in this case there is anm forwhich
T
16i6nR#CS ðwi;mÞ is
not empty, and mCS is the minimal number with this property. Now, let l 2
T
16i6nR#CS ðwi;mCS Þ. As l 2 R#CS ðwi;mCS Þ for every
1 6 i 6 n, we have that dðl;wiÞ 6 mCS for all wi 2 C, and so dd;maxðl;CÞ 6 mCS . Suppose for contradiction that l R D#CS ðCÞ. Then
there is a valuation m 2 Kx#CM such that dd;maxðm;CÞ < dd;maxðl;CÞ 6 mCS . Thus, maxfdðm;w1Þ; . . . ; dðm;wnÞg < mCS , and so
dðm;wiÞ ¼ ki < mCS for every 1 6 i 6 n. Now, let k ¼maxfk1; . . . ; kng. Then m 2 R#CS ðwi; kÞ for every 1 6 i 6 n, henceT
16i6nR#CS ðwi; kÞ is non-empty for some k < mCS , in contradiction to the minimality ofmCS .
For the converse, let l 2 D#CS ðCÞ. As dðl;wiÞ 6 dd;maxðl;CÞ for all 1 6 i 6 n, necessarily l 2 R#CS ðwi; dd;maxðl;CÞÞ and soT
16i6nR#CS ðwi; dd;maxðl;CÞÞ is non-empty. Suppose for a contradiction that there is some k < m ¼ dd;maxðl;CÞ such thatT
16i6nR#CS ðwi; kÞ is non-empty, and let m 2
T
16i6nR#CS ðwi; kÞ. Then m 2 R#CS ðwi; kÞ for every 1 6 i 6 n, and so dðm;wiÞ 6 k for
every wi 2 C. Thus, dd;maxðm;CÞ 6 k < m ¼ dd;maxðl;CÞ, a contradiction to our assumption that l 2 D#CS ðCÞ. h
The last proposition induces the algorithm in Fig. 4 for computing most plausible valuations of theories whenever it is
possible to effectively compute the iþ 1th sphere from the ith sphere:
Deﬁnition 30 (Inductively representable settings). A setting S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ; f i is inductively representable in a context C, if there
is a computable function GC, such that for every formula w and every i 2 N,R#CS ðw; iÞ ¼ GCðR#CS ðw; i 1ÞÞ:
The function GC is called an inductive representation of S in C.Example 20. Let us consider some inductive representations of settings of the form S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ;maxi.
1. Suppose that d is either dﬄ;max or dr;max. It is easy to see that for every context C and every iP 1,R#CS ðw; iÞ ¼ Kx#CM . Thus, any
function GC such that GCðSÞ ¼ Kx#CM for every S#Kx#CM , is an inductive representation of S in C.fact, as for every 1 6 i 6 n there is a ki 6maxfd#Cðm1; m2Þjm1; m2 2 Kx#CM g such that for every jP ki;R#CS ðwi; jÞ ¼ KxM , it is sufﬁcient to take
fkij1 6 i 6 ng.
Fig. 4. Computing the most plausible valuations of fw1; . . . ;wng w.r.t. S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ;maxi.
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coincide. Moreover, in the static case it holds that for every l; m 2 Ks#CM ; dﬄ;Rðl; mÞ ¼ i iff l differs from m on its assignments
for exactly i atoms. In this case, then, an inductive representation of S in C could be any function GC such that, for every
S#Ks#CM ;GCðSÞ ¼ S [
S
l2S1DiffðlÞ, where 1DiffðlÞ is the set of all valuations differing from l in exactly one assignment of
an atom.
By Proposition 17, we have:
Proposition 18. Let S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ;maxi be a setting, C a theory, and G an inductive representation of S in SFðCÞ. Then the
algorithm MPV ðS;G;CÞ in Fig. 4 terminates and computes D#SFðCÞS ðCÞ.4.2. Summation of distances
We now consider settings of the form S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ;Ri, and again represent the reasoning process in these settings by
systems of spheres.
Deﬁnition 31. Let S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ; f i be a setting, C a context, and w a formula. Deﬁne, for iP 1:0R#CS ðwÞ ¼ modx#CM ðwÞ
iR#CS ðwÞ ¼ R#CS ðw; iÞ n R#CS ðw; i 1ÞThus, iR#CS ðwÞ is the ith ‘buttonhole’ of w with respect to d, consisting of all the valuations in Kx#CM , the distance of which
to w is exactly i.
Proposition 19. For a setting S ¼ hM; ðd;xÞ;Ri and a theory C ¼ fw1; . . . ;wng,D#SFðCÞS ðCÞ ¼
[
r1þ...þrn¼nCS
\
16i6n
riR#SFðCÞS ðwiÞ;where nCS is the minimal number k 2 N such that
T
16i6nR#SFðCÞS ðwi; riÞ is not empty and
Pn
i¼1ri ¼ k.Proof. For C ¼ SFðCÞ, let l 2 D#CS ðCÞ, and suppose that dðl;wiÞ ¼ ki for i ¼ 1; . . . ;n. Then for every 1 6 i 6 n;l 2 kiR#CS ðwiÞ.
Now, if there is no sequence r1; . . . ; rn, such that R
n
i¼1ri ¼ nCS , and for which l 2
T
16i6nriR#CS ðwiÞ, then, by the minimality
of nCS , it is not the case that k1 þ . . .þ kn < nCS . Thus, since k1 þ . . .þ kn – nCS , necessarily k1 þ . . .þ kn > nCS . By the assumption
of the proposition, there is a sequence r1; . . . ; rn such that R
n
i¼1ri ¼ nCS and for which
T
16i6nR#CS ðwi; riÞ is not empty. So let
m 2 T16i6nR#CS ðwi; riÞ. Then dd;Rðm;CÞ ¼ nCS < Rni¼1ki ¼ dd;Rðl;CÞ, in contradiction to our assumption that l 2 D#CS ðCÞ.
For the converse, suppose that l 2 Sr1þ...þrn¼nCST16i6nriR#CS ðwiÞ. Then dðl;wiÞ ¼ ri for some sequence r1; . . . ; rn, such that
r1 þ . . .þ rn ¼ nCS . If l R D#CS ðCÞ there is some m 2 D#CS ðCÞ such that dd;Rðm;CÞ < dd;Rðl;CÞ. But then dðm;w1Þ þ . . .þ
dðm;wnÞ < nCS and so there is a sequence dðm;w1Þ; . . . ; dðm;wnÞ, such that
T
16i6nR#CS ðwi; dðm;wiÞÞ is not empty, in contradiction
to the minimality of nCS . h
Proposition 19 suggests that reasoning with summation of distances may be implemented as a constraint programming
problem, which can be solved using some off-the-shelf constraint logic programming (CLP) solvers.
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We now demonstrate how the framework introduced here can be easily generalized to other kinds of denotational
semantics. Speciﬁcally, we consider an extension of standard ‘‘possible worlds” (Kripke-) semantics, where the logical con-
nectives are interpreted by a matrixM. It is important to note that sticking to standard matrices is for simplicity only, and
that this framework can also be extended to the other semantic structures discussed previously.
As usual, we use the necessitation operator ‘‘ ” for expressing qualiﬁcations of the truth of a judgement. In case of the
classical two-valued matrix this induces the usual Kripke-style semantics. Other semantic notions that are related to the dis-
tance semantics, such as generic distances and their concrete constructions, also carry onto Kriple-style semantics in a
straightforward way, as explained below.
Our generalized many-valued possible worlds semantics, deﬁned next, is a variant of the one in [24]:
Deﬁnition 32 (Frames and frame interpretations).
– A frame for L is a triple F ¼ hW;R;Mi, whereW is a non-empty set (of ‘‘worlds”), R (the ‘‘accessibility relation”) is a binary
relation on W, and M¼ hV;D;Oi is a (standard) matrix for L. We say that a frame is ﬁnite if so is W.
– Let F ¼ hW;R;Mi be a frame for L. An F-valuation is a function m : W WL ! V that assigns truth values to the L-formu-
las at each world in W according to the following conditions: For every connective } in the language L (except for ),
 mðw;}ðw1; . . . ;wnÞÞ ¼ ~}Mðmðw;w1Þ; . . . ; mðw;wnÞÞ,
 mðw;wÞ 2 D iff mðw0;wÞ 2 D for all w0 such that Rðw;w0Þ.
The set of F-valuations is denoted by KsF. The set of F-valuations that satisfy a formula w in a world w 2W is denoted by
modsFðw;wÞ, that is, modsFðw;wÞ ¼ fm 2 KsFjmðw;wÞ 2 Dg.
– The restriction to a context C of a valuation m 2 KsF is denoted by m#C. As before, we denote: Ks#CF ¼ fm#Cjm 2 KsFg.
– A frame interpretation is a pair I ¼ hF; mi, in which F ¼ hW;R;Mi is a frame and m is an F-valuation. We say that I satisﬁes w
(or that I is a model of w), if m 2 modsFðw;wÞ for every w 2W . We say that I satisﬁes C if it satisﬁes every w 2 C.
Let I be a non-empty set of frame interpretations. Deﬁne a satisfaction relation sI on I WL by I sI w iff I satisﬁes w.
Denote by modsI ðCÞ the set of all the frame interpretations in I that satisfy all the formulas of C. Note that I ¼ hI ;sI i is a
denotational semantics in the sense of Deﬁnition 2.
We now extend the distance-related notions from Section 3 to the context of ﬁnite frames. The notion of generic distances
from Deﬁnition 17 is extended as follows:
Deﬁnition 33 (Restrictions and generic distances). For a frame F, let d be a function on
S
fC¼SFðCÞjCis a theory inLgK
s#C
F Ks#CF .
– The restriction of d to a context C is a function d#C on Ks#CF  Ks#CF , deﬁned for every m;l 2 Ks#CF by d#Cðm;lÞ ¼ dðm;lÞ.
– We say that d is a generic (pseudo) distance on KsF if for every context C; d
#C is a (pseudo) distance on Ks#CF .Deﬁnition 34. Let F ¼ hW;R;Mi be a ﬁnite frame, I ¼ hF; mi a frame interpretation, d a generic distance on KsF;C a context,
C ¼ fw1; . . . ;wng a theory, and f ; g aggregation functions. We deﬁne:d#Cðw; m;wÞ ¼
minfd#Cðm#C;l#CÞjl 2 modsFðw;wÞg modsFðw;wÞ – ;;
1þmaxfdðm#C;l#CÞjm;l 2 KsFg otherwise;
8<:
d#Cf ðI;wÞ ¼ f d#Cðw; m;wÞjw 2W
n o 
;
d#Cd;f ;gðI;CÞ ¼ g d#Cf ðI;w1Þ; . . . ;d#Cf ðI;wnÞ
n o 
:The intuition here is, as before, to measure how ‘close’ a frame interpretation is to satisfying a formula and a theory. First,
we deﬁne the ‘closeness’ of the interpretation to a formula in each world, and then aggregate over all possible worlds and all
the formulas of the theory. The following analogue of Proposition 9 and Corollary 5 shows that we indeed remain faithful to
the basic intuition behind distance-based reasoning.Proposition 20. Let F ¼ hW;R;Mi be a frame, I ¼ hF; mi a corresponding frame interpretation, C a context, and d a pseudo
distance on KsF.
– For every formula w such that AtomsðwÞ#C and for all m 2 KsF and w 2W, we have that d#Cðw; m;wÞ ¼ 0 iff m 2 modsFðw;wÞ.
– For every theory C such that AtomsðCÞ#C, we have that d#Cd;f ;gðI;CÞ ¼ 0 iff I satisﬁes C.
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l 2 modsFðw;wÞ such that d#Cðm#C;l#CÞ ¼ 0. Since d#C is a pseudo distance on KsF, necessarily m#C ¼ l#C. As AtomsðwÞ#C andM
is deterministic, m and l agree on the atoms of w and so also on w, hence m 2 modsFðw;wÞ.
For the second part, suppose that d#Cd;f ;gðI;CÞ ¼ g d
#C
f ðI;w1Þ; . . . ; d#Cf ðI;wnÞ
n o 
¼ 0. Then, since g is an aggregation function,
d#Cf ðI;wiÞ ¼ f d#Cðw; m;wÞjw 2W
n o 
¼ 0 for all 1 6 i 6 n. Since f is an aggregation function, d#Cðw; m;wiÞ ¼ 0 for every w 2W ,
and since wi 2 C; AtomsðwiÞ#AtomsðCÞ#C. Hence by the ﬁrst part, m 2 modsFðw;wÞ, and so I satisﬁes w. The converse of the
second part also follows by the ﬁrst part. h
As before, the last proposition implies that the most appropriate contexts to use are those that include all the atoms of the
premises, that is: for a set C of premises we evaluate distances with respect to the context C ¼ AtomsðCÞ. Note that when
extending the framework to non-deterministic matrices, the above proposition does not hold for C ¼ AtomsðCÞ (but it does
hold, e.g., for C ¼ SFðCÞ, as in Section 3; cf. Corollary 5 and the paragraph that proceeds it).
The following deﬁnition should be compared with Deﬁnition 21. This time, the role of a matrix in a setting is taken by a
set of frames, and an additional function (for an aggregation over the possible worlds) is needed.
Deﬁnition 35 (Settings). A (semantical) setting for a language L is a quadruple K ¼ hI ; d; f ; gi, where I is a set of ﬁnite
frames, d is a generic pseudo distance on KsF for every hF; mi 2 I , and f ; g are aggregation functions.Example 21. Let I be a set of ﬁnite two-valued frames (i.e., frames of the form hW;R;Mi, whereM is a two-valued matrix).
A variety of generic pseudo distances can be deﬁned on I by:20 Recdðm;lÞ ¼ g2 fdr;g1 ðw; m;lÞjw 2Wg
 
;where dr;g1 ðw; m;lÞ is deﬁned for a world w 2W like the pseudo distance dr;g1 ðm;lÞ considered in Proposition 8, by the func-
tion r, deﬁned in Deﬁnition 19. That is,dr;g1 ðw; m;lÞ ¼ g1 rðmðw;wÞ;lðw;wÞÞjw 2 Atomsf gð Þ:
Note that for a ﬁnite set Atoms, taking the function g1 to be R or max leads to natural generalizations of the Hamming and the
drastic distances, respectively (recall Note 3).
The most plausible interpretations of a theory C are now deﬁned just like in Deﬁnition 2320:
Deﬁnition 36 (Most plausible frame interpretations). Let K ¼ hI ; d; f ; gi be a setting. The set of the most plausible frame
interpretations of C – ; with respect to K is deﬁned as follows:DKðCÞ ¼ I 2 Ij8J 2 I d#AtomsðCÞd;f ;g ðI;CÞ 6 d#AtomsðCÞd;f ;g ðJ;CÞ
n o
:If C ¼ ;, we deﬁne DKð;Þ ¼ I .
For a (multi-valued) possible world semantics I ¼ hI ;sI i and a corresponding semantic setting K ¼ hI ; d; f ; gi we deﬁne,
like before,C w iff DKðCÞ#modsIðwÞ:Note that: (i) the preferential operator DK is non-empty for every C, and (ii) whenevermod
s
I ðCÞ is non-empty, by Proposition
20, modsI ðCÞ ¼ DKðCÞ. Hence, under the conditions of Proposition 6 and by that proposition, is an inconsistency-tolerant
variant of ‘sI.
The usefulness of for reasoning with incomplete and inconsistent information is demonstrated in the next example.
Example 22. Consider two companies a and b and two investment houses, h1 and h2. An investment house h buys shares of a
company if the latter is recommended by all the investment houses that h knows; otherwise h sells its shares. This can be
modeled by a language L ¼ f;^;:g, and the classical two-valued matrix Mcl with the standard interpretations for the
connectives of L. We use two atoms in L: Ra and Rb (where Rx intuitively means that ‘company x is recommended’) and
denote by BuyðxÞ and by SellðxÞ (for x 2 fa; bg) the formulas Rx, and :Rx, respectively.
Suppose now that a third party, call it h3, wants to detect the trading intentions of the two investment houses. However,
h3 faces two problems. One is that h3 gets contradictory rumors about these intentions: One rumor says that both houses are
going to buy shares of a and b: Buyða; bÞ ¼ BuyðaÞ ^ BuyðbÞ, and the other rumor claims that they will sell the shares of a. The
third party has, then, an inconsistent theory describing the situation C ¼ fBuyða; bÞ; SellðaÞg.all that as we are dealing here with deterministic matrices, the context SFðCÞ may safely be replaced by the context AtomsðCÞ.
Table 2
Computations of DKðCÞ for Example 22.
Ii miðh1;RaÞ miðh1;RbÞ miðh2;RaÞ miðh2;RbÞ dðh1; mi;SÞ dðh2; mi; SÞ dðh1; mi;BÞ dðh2; mi;BÞ dðI;CÞ
I11 f f f f 0 0 4 4 8
I12 f f f t 0 0 3 3 6
I13 f f t f 0 0 3 3 6
I14 f f t t 0 0 2 2 4
I15 f t f f 0 0 3 3 6
I16 f t f t 0 0 2 2 4
I15 f t t f 0 0 2 2 4
I18 f t t t 0 0 1 1 2
I19 t f f f 0 0 3 3 6
I110 t f f t 0 0 2 2 4
I111 t f t f 1 1 2 2 6
I112 t f t t 1 1 1 1 4
I113 t t f f 0 0 2 2 4
I114 t t f t 0 0 1 1 2
I115 t t t f 1 1 1 1 4
I116 t t t t 1 1 0 0 2
I21 f f f f 0 0 2 2 4
I22 f f f t 0 0 2 1 3
I23 f f t f 0 1 2 1 4
I24 f f t t 0 1 2 0 3
I25 f t f f 0 0 1 2 3
I26 f t f t 0 0 1 1 2
I27 f t t f 0 1 1 1 3
I28 f t t t 0 1 1 0 2
I29 t f f f 1 0 1 2 4
I210 t f f t 1 0 1 1 3
I211 t f t f 1 1 1 1 4
I212 t f t t 1 1 1 0 3
I213 t t f f 1 0 0 2 3
I214 t t f t 1 0 0 1 2
I215 t t t f 1 1 0 1 3
I216 t t t t 1 1 0 0 2
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accessibility must be symmetric and reﬂexive). This can be represented by two frames Fi ¼ hW;Ri;Mcli (for i ¼ 1;2), in
which W ¼ fh1; h2g, R1 ¼ fhh1;h2i; hh2;h1i; hh1;h1i; hh2;h2ig, and R2 ¼ fhh1;h1i; hh2;h2ig.21 The corresponding possible world
semantics is I ¼ hI ;sI i with I ¼
S
i¼1;2fhF i; mijm 2 KsF ig.
In order to make plausible decisions despite these uncertainties, h3 uses , the inconsistency-tolerant variant of ‘sI,
induced by the setting K ¼ hI ; d;R;Ri, where d is a generic distance for I , deﬁned by21 Bot
22 Sinc
and d#A
23 To
accessibdðm;lÞ ¼ Rw2WRw2AtomsðCÞdU mðw;wÞ;lðw;wÞð Þ:
The relevant frame interpretations are represented in Table 2.22
It follows that DKðCÞ ¼ fI18; I114; I116; I26; I28; I214; I216g23 and so C BuyðbÞ while C SellðaÞ. The third party anticipates, then,
that the other houses will buy b, but it cannot infer that they will sell a.6. Conclusion and future work
Following the work in [5], the main theme of this paper is that the combination of (non-deterministic) matrix-based
semantics on one hand, and distance-based preferential semantics on the other hand, provides a robust framework for rea-
soning with situations involving incompleteness and inconsistency. The main advantages of this framework are the
following:h of R1 and R2 are reﬂexive, since each house knows its own policy.
e the form of each frame interpretation is either I1i ¼ hF 1; mii or I2i ¼ hF 2; mii, we specify only mi . Also, we abbreviate d#AtomsðCÞðh; mi; SellðaÞÞ by dðh; mi; SÞ,
tomsðCÞðh; mi;Buyða; bÞÞ by dðh; mi;BÞ. Finally, we write dðI;CÞ instead of d#AtomsðCÞd;R;R ðI;CÞ.
illustrate the role of the accessibility relation in computing DKðCÞ, consider e.g. I16 and I26 in Table 2. These frame interpretations differ only in the
ility relations of their respective frames, however, only the latter is in DKðCÞ.
Fig. 5. A partially unknown circuit.
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semantics of the framework.24 The choice of the speciﬁc structure may be determined by the type of incompleteness that
needs to be captured (for instance, unknown versus non-deterministic behaviour of circuit components).
2. Modularity. The two sources of uncertainty considered in this paper, namely inconsistency and incompleteness, are not
necessarily dependent. This is reﬂected in our framework by separating its two ingredients: the choices of the semantic
structure and the distance functions are independent. Still, given a semantic structure, some distance functions may be
more appropriate than others; A formulation of general guidelines on how to choose natural distances for a given seman-
tic structure is a subject for future research.
3. Effectiveness. From a more practical point of view, we have shown that the entailments that can be deﬁned in our frame-
work are decidable (for computable settings). Moreover, as shown in Section 4, for many natural choices of settings, exist-
ing automated tools, such as CLP solvers, may be incorporated and adapted to general semantic structures, to be used in
practical applications, such as those considered here.
The main contribution of this paper is the investigation of new types of two-valued semantic structures in the context of
distance-based non-deterministic reasoning with uncertainty. In particular, some new semantic structures are introduced
and the relations among them are analyzed in Section 2. We have also introduced some new methods of constructing dis-
tance functions, tailored speciﬁcally for non-deterministic semantics. In Section 3, we have shown that some of the obtained
distances are conservative extensions of well-known distances, used so far only in the classical case, while some others have
not been considered before. In Section 4, different algorithms for reasoning with distance semantics are generalized to our
extended semantic settings and some natural examples in the context of systems of spheres are considered. Finally, in Sec-
tion 5 we adapt our framework to the context of possible worlds semantics. To the best of our knowledge, distance reasoning
with multi-valued (non-deterministic) matrices has not been considered before in this context.
There are a number of directions in which this work may be extended. Generalizations to many-valued semantics and
ﬁrst-order languages are two obvious ones. This will enrich the current framework with new distance functions and entail-
ment relations for more general situations. Another direction is the incorporation of non-deterministic matrices augmented
with preferences among the non-deterministic choices.
We also plan to investigate concrete applications for our framework, such as model-based diagnostic systems, which of-
ten require reasoning with uncertainty. In such cases, one may need richer languages for dealing with the non-deterministic
behaviour of the circuits. To see this, consider the circuit on Fig. 5, where } represents some non-deterministic connective.
Note that a representation of this circuit by the formula24 Thi
basic de
25 Notout$ ðin1 } in2Þ _ ðin1 } in2Þð Þ ^ ðin1 } in2Þ _ ðin1 } in2Þð Þ
is not accurate, as this formula suggests that, say, the ﬁrst and the second occurrences of ðin1 } in2Þ in this formula should
take the same values, while they may not.25 This may be solved by associating each unknown gate to a different operator (}1
and }2), as in the following formula:out$ ðin1 }1 in2Þ _ ðin1 }2 in2Þð Þ ^ ðin1 }1 in2Þ _ ðin1 }2 in2Þð Þ:
Obviously, this is a rather cumbersome representation of the circuit. A better approach could be to incorporate more expres-
sive formalisms, such as cirquent calculus [32], that are ‘tuned’ for reasoning with circuit-like representable problems.References
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